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This study examines why Africa as a region continues to attract less Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and also has the lowest agricultural productivity among 
developing countries and tropical countries respectively. Attracting enough FDI will 
at least theoretically boost domestic investment, increase employment, enhance 
technology transfer and increase domestic exports (by making domestic firms 
competitive). The Agricultural sector employs a greatest share of Africa‟s labor force 
and also contributes most of Africa‟s nominal GDP. Therefore increasing 
agricultural productivity will go a long way in not only reducing rural unemployment 
but also reducing poverty. It has also been shown that growth in agricultural 
productivity is more poverty reducing that a similar growth in manufacturing sector. 
In chapter 2, using pooled feasible generalized least squares (with individual 
fixed effect) on an unbalanced panel of between 55 and 77 countries, from 1984-
2005, I examine the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing 
countries in general and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular. I find that extensive 
economic infrastructure is necessary for FDI flow to developing countries. With 
respect to institutional variables, the results also show that a stable government and 
conducive investment environment are associated with higher levels of FDI flow to 
developing countries. The results again show that while some of the regressors affect 
FDI inflow to sub-Saharan Africa in the same way, they do with respect to that of 
non sub-Saharan Africa, other regressors affect sub-Saharan Africa FDI inflow 
differently. For instance while infrastructural development, stable government, and 
conducive investment climate are associated with higher inflow of FDI to sub-
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Saharan Africa and non sub-Saharan Africa regions, availability of natural resources 
(i.e. fuel exports) is positively associated with FDI inflow to SSA, but negatively 
associated with FDI to areas outside of SSA. Also the results show that below a 
certain threshold, larger GDP per capita and lower corruption level are positively 
associated with FDI flow to SSA. Other robustness checks show that the results are 
similar in the two datasets and various specifications. 
In chapter 3, we examine the determinants of agricultural productivity in the 
tropics, and test whether these determinants affect tropical sub-Saharan Africa 
agriculture differently than in other tropical regions. We find that fertilizer usage, 
telephones, and rainfall have a positive and significant effect on agricultural 
productivity, while tractor usage and most institutional variables are insignificant.  
Interestingly, we find evidence that the effect of irrigation and rainfall differs inside 
and outside of tropical sub-Saharan Africa.  Outside of Africa, irrigation positively 
and significantly impacts productivity.  Inside it, the effect is either insignificant or 
highly muted.  In an expanded sample of countries, we show that rainfall has a 
positive and significant impact on productivity in tropical SSA, but an insignificant 
effect outside of the region. 
I discuss what needs to be done in Africa for it to increase its agricultural 
productivity in chapter 4. I review all the various interventions that have taken place 
in Africa with the goal of boosting its agricultural productivity, but failed to realize 
that goal. In particular I look at why the earlier Green Revolution that transformed 
agricultural productivity in most of the Asian and Latin American countries stalled in 
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Africa. I then examined the two main approaches (i.e. focused approach and 
comprehensive approach) that have been suggested in the literature to improve 
Africa‟s agricultural productivity. The proponents of the comprehensive approach 
note the complex nature of Africa‟s agricultural problems and hence propose that the 
solution should be multifaced and coordinated. Those who advocate for the focused 
approach argue that with scarce budgets, the solution to Africa‟s agricultural 
problems should be concise and focused on the more binding constraints to 
agricultural productivity. Finally, I argue that the approach that Africa adopts (be it 
comprehensive or focused approach) is not the key, but rather the significant role 
that African leaders will need to play. African leaders will have to improve rural 
infrastructure, make technology adoption affordable through the use of subsidies and 
micro-financing. Also African leaders will have to provide safety nets for farmers to 
reduce the risk in adopting new technology. Without African leaders providing these 





Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be one of the slowest growing region of the 
world at least in the post World War II era. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has 
been argued to be very important in African countries and development partners‟ 
efforts in reducing or eradicating poverty in Africa. For instance the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration indicates that FDI will help Africa‟s Millennium 
Development goal of reducing poverty by half by 2015. FDI is very important to the 
African continent in filling the resource gap, because income levels and savings are 
generally low and official assistance declined in the 1990s. The official assistance to 
SSA declined by 41% between 1990 and 2001 (World Bank, 2003). However, while 
FDI flow to developing countries has seen some increase in the past decade, the 
increase in inflow to Africa has not kept pace with that of other parts of the world. 
For instance, between 2007 and 2009, on average, the proportion of world FDI flows 
to Latin America and the Caribbean, and South, East and Southeast Asia were 9.5% 
and 16.3% respectively. That of Africa for the same period was 4% (UNCTAD, 
2010).  
Africa‟s economy is mostly agrarian, with the agriculture sector employing 
about 65% of the labor force and contributing about 30% of GDP growth rate. Also 
studies have shown that increase in GDP growth rate due to increase in agricultural 
labor productivity is about twice more effective in improving the incomes of the poor 
a similar growth in GDP due to increase in non agricultural labor productivity. In 
particular, Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) find that an increase in overall GDP 
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caused by an increase in agricultural labor productivity on average raises incomes of 
the poorest quintile 2.9 times more in developing countries and 2.5 times more in 
Latin America, than a similar increase in GDP caused by nonagricultural labor 
productivity.
1
 Agricultural productivity in Africa, however, has not seen the same 
growth experienced in different parts of Asia and Latin America during the earlier 
Green Revolution. The reasons cited for this low agricultural productivity ranges 
from unfriendly tropical climate and its adverse effects on agricultural productivity, 
difficulty in transferring temperate agricultural technology to the tropics, to lack of 
appropriate public policies.  
Chapter 2 examines the determinants of FDI flow to developing countries in 
general and whether investors look at different factors when investing in SSA than 
investing in areas outside of SSA. Using fixed effect GLS, I find that the extensive 
economic infrastructure attracts FDI to developing countries. The results also show 
that a stable government and conducive investment environment are associated with 
higher levels of FDI inflow to developing countries. The results again show that 
while infrastructural development, stable government, and conducive investment 
climate are associated with higher inflow of FDI to sub-Saharan Africa and non sub-
Saharan Africa regions, availability of natural resources (i.e. fuel exports) is 
positively associated with FDI inflow to SSA, but negatively associated with FDI to 
areas outside of SSA. Also the results show that below a certain threshold, larger 
                                                          
1
 However in a recent study evaluating the impact of Milennium Village Project (MVP), Wanjala and 
Muradian (2011) found out that in the Sauri Millennium Village in Kenya, though agricultural 
productivity increased by about 70%, income levels of farmers did not change. One of the reasons 
cited for this break in linkage between agricultural productivity and incomes of the poor, is the small 
size of the farms (about 0.5 hectares per household) and hence most of the increase in productivity 
going to consumption. 
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GDP per capita and lower corruption level are positively associated with FDI flow to 
SSA. Other robustness checks show that the results are similar in the two datasets 
and various specifications. 
In chapter 3, we investigate the determinants of tropical agricultural 
productivity in a panel of 27 tropical developing countries across several regions for 
the years 1984 to 2005.  We examine the role that institutions, government policies, 
traditional inputs, and infrastructure play in explaining differences in agricultural 
productivity across tropical countries, and whether the effect of these variables is 
significantly different in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. In the full sample, 
we find that fertilizer consumption, the number of telephone subscribers (both 
mainline and cell phones), rainfall, and irrigation are important to agricultural 
productivity. However, institutional variables, bureaucratic quality, government 
stability, and corruption, are all insignificant in the full sample.  When we construct 
interaction variables to test whether the effect of these variables are different in SSA, 
we find some interesting results.  First, fertilizer consumption, telephones, and 
rainfall have a positive and significant impact on agricultural productivity across 
regions. Second, the coefficients on tractor usage and the institutional variables are 
insignificant.  Last, irrigation has a positive and significant effect outside of tropical 
SSA, but no significant effect within the region. Expanding our sample by using an 
alternative measure of tropicality yields very similar results. The main differences 
are that the effect of rainfall is now only significant in tropical SSA, and two of the 
institutional variables are weakly significant. 
4 
 
In chapter 4, I examine the two main approaches (the focused and 
comprehensive) suggested in the literature to help Africa transform its agricultural 
productivity. The proponents of the comprehensive approach note the complex 
nature of Africa‟s agricultural problems and hence propose that the solution should 
be multifaced and coordinated. Those who advocate for the focused approach argue 
that with scarce budgets, the solution to Africa‟s agricultural problems should be 
concise and focused on the more binding constraints to agricultural productivity. I 
also look at the prospect of South-South cooperation instead of the typical North 
(Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research - CGIAR) - South 
cooperation, in part because southern countries often have similar climates and may 
have faced similar agricultural challenges (e.g. bad soil, drought like in Brazil‟s 
Cerrado), and therefore may be able to help more effectively.
2
 It should be noted 
that South-South cooperation can be either comprehensive or focused. I argue that no 
matter the kind of approach African countries adopt, the key to agricultural 
transformation requires a strong commitment from African leaders, with respect to 
the provision of needed infrastructure, improved institutions, and ensuring an 
enabling environment, and a coordinated effort by all partners (i.e. International 
Agricultural Research systems (IARs), National Agricultural Research Centers 
(NARCs), Sub-regional Research Organizations (SROs), both bilateral and 
                                                          
2
 The 15 international agricultural research centers are: International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT), International 
Potato Center (CIP), Biodiversity International, International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI), Africa Rice Center (WARDA), International Crop Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), International 
Water . Management Institute (IWMI), International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), WorldFish 
Center, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), and World Agroforestry Center. 
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multilateral development partners and philanthropists). Africa‟s agriculture will still 
be underdeveloped if cooperation yields promising improved varieties and there are 
no efficient extension services to make the farmers aware of the new varieties and 
how to plant them or if other complementary inputs like fertilizer are not affordable 
because of poorly functioning markets for inputs and outputs. There is only so much 
the development partners will be able to do. 
The study is organized as follows: chapter 2 examines the determinants of 
FDI inflow to developing countries in general and SSA countries in particular. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the determinants of tropical agricultural productivity. Section 4 
focuses on the role that African leaders needs to play in transforming their 
















The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Why 
does Africa continue to underperform? 
2.1 Introduction  
Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has been the slowest growing 
region in the post World War II period. For instance, while annual average per capita 
GDP growth rate for sub Saharan Africa was 0.5% between 1965-90, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific recorded an annual per capita GDP 
growth rate of 1.6% and 5% respectively between the same period. Though the 
average annual per capita GDP growth rate recorded by sub-Saharan Africa between 
2000 and 2009, 2%, is marginally more than that of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1.85%, it still lags far behind that of East Asia and the Pacific, 8%. The 
abysmal economic performance recorded by sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in a 
plethora of literature that attempts to explain the cause of this underperformance. 
Growth regressions have been able to uncover some of the causes. Studies have 
shown that low level of educational attainment, political instability, poorly 
developed financial systems, large black-market exchange rate premia, large 
government deficits and less foreign direct investment account for about half of the 
growth rate differential between Africa and East Asia (Easterly and Levine, 1998). In 
addition, it has also been documented that when a sub-Saharan Africa regional 
dummy variable is used in a growth regression it has a significant coefficient of -
0.015 (Easterly and Levine, 1998). This means that a country‟s predicted growth rate 
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will be 1.5 percentage points lower, due to the country being geographically located 
in Africa.  
There have been a lot of theoretical underpinnings touting the important role 
FDI can play in economic growth and development (with some theories pointing to 
possible adverse effect of FDI), the empirical results have been mostly mixed with 
respect to the growth potential of FDI. One theory points to the potential effects of 
FDI increasing domestic investment, employment, technology transfer and increased 
domestic exports (by making domestic firms competitive). A contrary theory also 
posits that FDI may crowd out domestic firms since domestic firms will not be able 
to compete with their foreign counterparts in terms of advertising power, improved 
technology, and predatory pricing. Also FDI may drive out domestic investment 
(especially Greenfield investment) by increasing the demand for money and hence 
interest rates.
3
 Finally a large FDI inflow may results in appreciation of exchange 
rate and hence decreasing net trade. The empirical results are mixed on the FDI 
impacts on domestic investment, and its growth potential. For instance while 
Borensztein et al. (1998) shows a positive effect of FDI on domestic capital 
formation, Lipsey (2000) indicates past FDI inflows do not have a significant 
positive influence on current period‟s investment ratio. With respect to economic 
growth effect of FDI, UNCTAD (1999), and Borensztein et al. (1998) find no direct 
effect of FDI on economic growth, though when FDI is interacted with variables like 
human capital, it has positive effect on economic growth. Thus FDI may have 
                                                          
3
 Greenfield investment is a form of Foreign Direct Investment where a foreign company builds a new 
facility from the scratch, unlike Mergers and Acquisition, the other form of FDI, where a foreign 
company team up with domestic investor(s) or acquire a domestic company. 
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positive impact on economic growth when there is capacity to absorb advanced 
technology. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been argued to be very important in 
African countries and developments partners‟ efforts in reducing or eradicating 
poverty in Africa. For instance the United Nations Millennium Declaration indicates 
that FDI will help Africa‟s Millennium Development goal of reducing poverty by 
half by 2015. FDI is very important to the African continent in filling the resource 
gap, because income levels and savings are generally low and official assistance 
declined in the 1990s. The official assistance to SSA declined by 41% between 1990 
and 2001 (World Bank, 2003). Though the Official assistance to Africa in the last 
decade has seen a steady increase, it still falls far below the amount needed for 
Africa to achieve its development goals. The need to attract FDI has been heeded by 
African leaders, who have fostered the necessary investment climate (trade 
liberalization, rule of law), macroeconomic framework (through devaluation, 
reduction of budget deficit and inflation), to political stability. Though the proportion 
of world FDI flow to developing countries has seen some increase in the past decade, 
the increase in inflow to sub-Saharan Africa has not kept pace with that of other parts 
of the world. For instance, while the proportion of world FDI flows to sub-Saharan 
Africa increased from 0.41% in 2000 to 2.75% in 2009, that of Latin America and 
Caribbean increased from 4.89% to 6.9% within the same period. For East Asia and 





 The absolute value of FDI to Africa increased steadily from $10 
billion in 2000 to a high of $72.2 billion in 2008, but declined to $58.6billion in 2009 
(WIR, 2010).  
This low inflow of FDI to sub-Saharan Africa has spurred research into the 
reasons behind this insufficient inflow of FDI to Africa. Asiedu (2002) examines 
whether the factors that have been found to attract FDI inflow affect Africa 
differently. She was able to show that these factors actually may be affecting Africa 
differently. In particular, she found that while higher return on capital and quality of 
infrastructure attract FDI to other non sub-Saharan developing countries, they are 
insignificant in the case of Africa. More importantly she also found that countries in 
Africa receive relatively low FDI by virtue of being located in Africa.  
This chapter is similar to Asiedu (2002), in the sense that I also examine the 
determinants of FDI to developing countries in general, and Africa in particular but 
this chapter is different with respect to both the regressors used and the econometric 
methodology applied. For instance, while Asiedu uses GDP growth rate, I use per 
capita GDP as a proxy for market size. I argue that per capita GDP is a better proxy 
for market size since it takes into account the population growth rate. Also in Asiedu, 
while the average of revolution and assassination is used to measure political 
instability, I use three variables (the number of coups, riots, and assassinations) 
separately to measure political instability. In this way, I will be able to investigate 
how each of these three variables affects FDI inflow. While Asiedu did not use any 
                                                          
4
 The FDI proportions are calculated from World Development Indicators, 2010, and for only 
developing countries in those regions referred to. 
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institutional variables, I explore five institutional variables: government stability, 
investment profile, law and order, corruption and internal conflict. Institutional 
variables are very important because those are the variables that policymakers can 
control. I use investment profile to measure investment climate instead of trade 
openness which is used by Asiedu. Since investment profile measures contract 
viability, profit repatriation, and payment delays, I argue that it will be a better proxy 
for the investment environment. Also, while Asiedu used ordinary least square 
(OLS), here I use pooled feasible generalized least square (GLS), with country fixed 
effects, to account for possible bias and inconsistent estimates caused by omitted 
variables. The GLS is able to correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation that may be present with OLS.   
The results indicate that a good business climate, better economic 
infrastructure, and government stability are associated with higher FDI inflow to 
developing countries in general. Also the result shows that while natural resources 
(i.e. fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandized exports) are positively related 
to FDI inflow to Africa, they are negatively associated with FDI to non-African 
developing countries. Also below certain level, higher GDP per capita, and lower 
corruption are positively associated with FDI flow to SSA. The result is robust to an 
alternative sample of countries, where I include all countries with at least five years 
of data availability, contrary to the main sample where only countries with at least 10 
years of data availability are included. The results therefore show that if SSA wants 
to boost its FDI inflow, then it will have to improve physical infrastructure, ensure 
government stability, and reduce official corruption.  
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For instance if government stability and investment profile increase by one 
index point, net FDI inflow per GDP to developing countries will increase by 5.9% 
and 7.3% respectively. If SSA increases its average telephone line (both fixed and 
mobile phones) from 16.76 (per 1000 people) to that of Honduras (30.91), the 
median country, SSA‟s FDI share of GDP will increase by about 3.8%. In the same 
way, if Uganda with an average telephone lines of 2.35 increases its average 
telephone levels to that of Honduras, Uganda‟s FDI share of GDP will increase by 
about 46.2%.   
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 2.2, I review the literature on 
FDI to developing countries and Africa in particular. Section 2.3 discusses the data 
and empirical methodology, while section 2.4 presents the results and robustness 
checks. The last section of the chapter is devoted to conclusions, and policy 
recommendations. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The literature on FDI flow has been expanding because researchers have been 
trying to explain the causes of the uneven distribution of FDI flow across regions and 
even within the same region or continent. Since 1991, FDI inflow to developing 
countries accounted for only a little over a third of total flows. This proportion 
actually decreased by 27% during the period 2002-2003, with Asia accounting for 
about 60% (UNCTAD, 2002 and 2003). In 2008, FDI flows to Latin America and 
the Caribbean increased by 24% compared to that of 2007 with Brazil accounting for 
about 30% of this increase in FDI inflow, and Mexico‟s FDI inflow dropping by 
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20% in relation to its 2007 FDI inflow (Economic Commission for Latin America-
ELAC, 2009). FDI to Africa has lagged behind other regions with most of FDI 
flowing to the primary sector. The primary sector accounted for about half the total 
flow to the region from 1996 to 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002). Countries with natural 
resources and/or huge market size (potential) like Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and South 
Africa were the top receivers of FDI inflow to Africa in 2009 (WIR, 2010). For 
instance, Nigeria (major oil producing country), Angola (oil producing country), and 
South Africa, with a large market accounted for about 65% of FDI inflow to Africa 
between 2000 and 2002 (World Bank, 2004a). However, Asiedu (2004) was able to 
show that other factors like good infrastructure, an educated labor force, 
macroeconomic stability, and openness to FDI are important determinants of FDI to 
Africa.  
Even though global FDI inflows and outflows declined in all the three major 
sectors (service, manufacturing, and primary), service and primary sectors continue 
to receive an increasing share of FDI. Global FDI flows started to recover in the 
bottom half of 2009 and have continued to recover in 2010 with developing and 
transitional economies serving as both key destination and source of global FDI flow 
(UNCTAD, 2010).  For the first time, developing and transitional economies now 
absorb half of global FDI flow, with major players being Asian countries like China 
which is now second largest destination for global FDI just behind the USA in 2009. 
China, Hong Kong (China) and Russian Federation are among the top 20 destination 
for investors in the world. The proportion of global Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) from developing countries have been increasing steadily from about a mere 
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8%, in 1990 to 28% in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2010). The South-South FDI has grown 
over the past 15 years with total outflows from developing countries increasing from 
about $4billion in 1985 to $61 billion in 2004. And most of these outflows went to 
other developing or transitional economies (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Traditionally most of the FDI flow to Africa has come from few developed 
countries, but a new trend of FDI inflow to Africa has been gaining grounds recently. 
FDI from developing countries and cross-border Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) 
has been increasing recently. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Portugal have accounted for most of the FDI flows to Africa between 
1996 and 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002). Typically FDI from developing countries has 
come from Asian countries like China, Taiwan, and India. These FDIs are also quite 
diversified ranging from manufacturing, service, information and technology, to 
natural resources. Investments from South Africa to other African countries have 
also been growing over the years.  
This dominant role developing and transitional economies are playing with 
respect to global FDI flow may mask the uneven nature of FDI flows among 
developing and transitional economies. Most of the FDI flow to developing countries 
has gone to few countries, mostly emerging markets. And a greater share of the total 
FDI flows from developing and transitional economies have gone to Africa, 
accounting for about 21% of FDI flows to the region between 2005 and 2008.  
For developing host countries, FDI from other developing countries provides 
some benefit in the form of technology transfer, managerial skills and a broader 
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source of capital (UNCTAD, 2006). FDI flowing from developing to other 
developing countries provides additional avenues for South-South cooperation. Also 
since TNCs from developing countries are likely to be using more simpler and labor-
intensive technologies, developing TNCs have more employment potential than their 
developed counterpart. In fact in sub-Saharan Africa, it has been found that labor-
intensities of developing country TNCs are larger than developed country TNCs 
(UNCTAD, 2006).  
The theoretical determinants of FDI can be grouped into micro-determinants, 
macro-determinants, and strategic determinants.  The empirical studies that have 
attempted to test these theoretical hypotheses have provided conflicting results. The 
micro-determinants are location specific factors and include labor cost, tariff and 
trade barriers, and government policies. Low labor cost and low trade barriers are 
argued to affect FDI inflow positively since low labor cost reduces cost of 
production and also low trade barriers help in importation of inputs at a relatively 
lower cost. Trade tariff (or “tax hopping hypothesis”) stipulates that in order for 
foreign companies to avoid high export tariffs, foreign companies locate in the host 
country. Thus countries with high tariffs may attract more FDI. There is empirical 
evidence for both the low labor cost and “tax hopping hypothesis”. Wheeler and 
Mody (1992), using 42 countries for the period 1982-1988 to examine the  
determinants of the US investment abroad found a positive relationship between 
labor cost and FDI inflow, and a negative relationship between FDI and taxes and 
tariffs. Government policies, including financial liberalization, provision of tax 
breaks and other incentives, and performance requirements (like the hiring and 
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training of local personnel, local content, and technology transfer) are touted as 
attracting FDI. The empirical evidence on government policies has been mixed 
(Helleiner, 1989; Dees, 1998).   
The macro-determinants of FDI include market size and growth, openness 
and exports, exchange rates, inflation rates, budget deficits, infrastructure and 
political stability. It is argued that firms may locate abroad to take advantage of a 
foreign market and hence the larger the market, the higher the FDI inflow. 
Chakrabarti (2001), using Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) to examine which of the 
determinants of FDI used in the literature are “robust‟ or “fragile” to small changes 
in the conditioning information set, found that per capita GDP is the most  robust of 
all the determinants used in the literature. But other papers have also found 
conflicting results for GDP per capita as cited by Asiedu (2002).  For instance 
Schneider and Frey (1985), using 54 least developed countries for the years 1976, 
1979, and 1980,  and Tsai (1994), using a sample of countries of either 62 or 51,and 
covering the periods 1975-1978 and 1983-1986, found a positive relationship 
between FDI and real GDP per capita. Loree and Guisinger (1995), examining the 
effects of policy and non policy determinants of the US firms locating abroad, and 
Wei (2000), looking at determinants of bilateral FDI for the period 1994-1996, 
however found a negative relation between GDP and FDI flow.  While the “tax 
hopping hypothesis” postulates that openness and exports will result in lower FDI 
inflow, international competition will result in higher productivity and hence attract 
higher FDI inflow. There are empirical evidences supporting the hypothesis that 
openness attracts FDI (Lucas, 1993; Edwards, 1990; Hausmann and Fernandez-
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Arias, 2000). Wheeler and Mody (1992), however, found the openness variable to be 
insignificant. The inflation rate serves as an indication of the stability of the domestic 
macro economy. The lower and more stable the inflation, the more FDI inflow 
expected. Infrastructural quality and political stability are thought to attract foreign 
investment. The empirical evidence on political instability has been mixed. While 
Schneider and Frey (1985) and Edwards (1990) found a negative relationship 
between political instability and FDI inflow, Loree and Guisinger(1995), and 
Hausmann Fernandez-Arias (2000) found the political instability variable 
insignificant. Foreign firms may also locate abroad for strategic reasons at least in 
the short run. This may include protecting a foreign market or to diversify a firm‟s 
activities. 
Geography and urbanization in particular have been recognized as driving 
forces that support FDI inflow. This is because it is argued that urbanization tends to 
serve as a hub for necessary inputs, like skilled labor, and amenities/infrastructure, 
like good roads, good banking systems, IT, etc. Naude and Krugell (2007), however, 
using panel data to examine the determinants of FDI from 1970 to 1990, found an 
urban population to be negatively related to FDI inflow. Naude and Krugell (2007) 
also found that geography variables like latitude, and elevation are positively related 
to FDI inflow.  
The methodologies that have been used to analyze FDI inflow have been 
varying and controversial as well. These empirical studies can be broadly grouped 
into three: micro (firm level) econometric studies, survey data based studies, and 
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aggregate econometric studies.  For instance, Woodward and Rolfe (1993) examined 
the location determinants of export oriented foreign direct investment for the 
Caribbean Basin using 187 new plant investments based on US Department of 
Commerce data, though country specific factors like per capita GNP and  political 
instability were used as regressors.  The problem with micro-data based studies is the 
difficulty in generalizing the results. Rolfe et al. (1993) also used a questionnaire to 
examine twenty specific incentives US based managers and companies with 
international investments believe do not restrict intercompany payments and 
dividends remittances. The survey based studies also have the disadvantage of 
having subjective responses. Most of the studies have been aggregate studies, and 
these forms of studies have provided the most mixed results. One reason that most 
researchers use the aggregate econometric method is the relative ease with which to 
get the data.  
This study will also be based on aggregate data looking at the determinants of 
inbound FDI to developing countries and whether the determinants of FDI to SSA 
are different from those of other developing countries. However some of the 
regressors I use here are different from those of Asiedu (2002), and I argue that these 
“new” regressors are more likely to affect FDI inflow. Also the econometric 
methodology I use here (pooled GLS with country fixed effect) is able to account for 
possible omitted variables and correct for both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Since OLS methodology cannot account for omitted variables, the 





2.3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
I study an unbalanced panel of 56 developing countries for the period 1984 – 
2005. Only countries with at least 10 years of data are included in the sample. But to 
check for robustness in the results, another sample of 77 developing countries, which 
includes all developing countries with at least five years of data, is used. Consistent 
with the literature on FDI inflow, I use net FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables used in this study can be broadly 
grouped into four: macroeconomic conditions and economic infrastructure, natural 
resources, institutional (or policy) variables, and political conflicts. To capture 
macroeconomic conditions and infrastructure, I use GDP per capita (adjusted for 
purchasing power parity), inflation, and the number of telephones (both fixed and 
mobile) per 1,000 people. GDP per capita is a proxy for both economic health and 
market size. It is the only variable that has been shown in the literature to be 
consistently positively related to FDI inflow (Chakrabarti, 2001).
5
 Inflation 
(measured here by GDP deflator) is expected to be negatively related to FDI inflow 
because inflation measures economic instability. Inflation is expected to be 
                                                          
5
 There have been a couple of papers that have found contrary results. While Edwards (1990) found a 
negative relationship between real GDP per capita and FDI inflow, Loree and Guisinger (1995) found 
real GDP per capita to be insignificantly related to FDI inflow. 
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negatively related to FDI flow.
6
 The number of telephones is expected to be 
positively related to FDI inflow since it is used to proxy for economic infrastructure. 
Fuel exports as a percentage of merchandised exports, and non-manufactured 
merchandized exports as a percentage of total exports are used to proxy for natural 
resources. These variables are expected to be positively related to FDI inflow 
especially for the African sample since the majority of FDI flow to Africa is in the 
primary sector, with most of the FDI inflow going to the oil sector. For instance 
Angola, and Nigeria, with oil accounting for over 90 percent of their total exports, 
are among the top three destinations (with the other destination being South Africa) 
for FDI between 2000 and 2002 (World Bank 2004a).  
As pointed out by Papaioannou (2009), it is very difficult to account for all 
institutional factors and norms in a country, some of which are hard to measure (e.g. 
traditional or religious norms, trust etc.). I use six variables (out of the 12 variables 
that make up the political risk rating constructed by the International Country Risk 
Guide) that I think are most relevant to measure institutional quality: investment 
profile, law and order, government stability, bureaucratic quality, internal conflict 
and corruption. Investment profile, which has subcomponents of contract viability, 
profits repatriation, and payment delays is expected to be positively related to FDI 
inflow (i.e. the better the investment profile, the higher the FDI inflow).  Law and 
order is expected to be positively related to the FDI inflow as well, since an impartial 
legal system and strict observance of the laws are key to contract adjudication.  I 
                                                          
6
 I use GDP deflator, instead of the consumer price index to measure inflation because it measures 
price changes in all aspect of the economy, including government expenditure, net trade and 
especially investment, which the consumer price index does not. 
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expect a stable government to be associated with higher FDI inflows. Bureaucratic 
quality, which measures how much the bureaucracy is autonomous from political 
pressure and has established mechanisms for recruitment and training, is also 
expected to be positively related to FDI inflow. Lower internal conflict, which has 
sub-components of civil war, terrorism, and civil disorder, is expected to be 
positively associated with higher FDI inflow. Corruption is also expected to be 




I measure political conflict with the number of coups, number of riots, and 
number of assassinations. Each of those three variables is expected to be negatively 
related to FDI inflow because high political conflicts increases the associated with 
investing in a given country and hence driving away investors. Like the institutional 
variables, I also experimented with weighted conflict index, constructed by Cross-
National Time Series Database.
8
 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give the summary statistics of all the variables used in 
both samples of countries.  Appendices 2.1 and 2.2 show detailed definitions of the 
variables used and their sources, and the list of countries in the sample and the years 
of data availability for each country respectively. 
                                                          
7
 I also use the composite index for political risk rating constructed by the ICRG, and also entered 
each of the 6 institutional variables, all of them simultaneously in the baseline estimation, and one at a 
time to check for possible multicollinearity. The results did not change, and it is available upon 
request.  
8 Even though both internal conflict and the political risk variables (coups, assassinations, and riots) 
measure conflict in some form, the political risk variables measure different aspect of conflict than 




2.3.2 Initial Testing and Empirical Methodology 
I decided to go with the Least Square (country) dummy variable because of 
the advantage of this model being able to account for possible omitted country 
specific variables that may affect FDI inflow. But it is also possible that a simple 
Ordinary Least Square with regional dummies fits the data better. I therefore, use an 
F-test to determine whether a simple Ordinary Least Square with regional dummies 
fits the data better than either OLS with country dummies. In this way, I test whether 
the relative increase in the degrees of freedom in using the simpler model with fewer 
parameters (e.g. OLS with regional dummies) is sufficient to compensate for the 
relative decrease in the sum of squares residuals as a result of using fewer 
parameters. The F-statistic is calculated as the ratio of relative decrease in the sum of 
square residuals, to the relative increase in degrees of freedom as a result of using the 
OLS model with only regional fixed effects. Since the F-statistic (7.60) is greater 
than the F-critical value at the 5% level of significance (with degrees of freedom of 
53 and 930, which is equal to 1.35), I conclude that using OLS with country 
dummies statistically improves the fit of the model.  
I then use a Hausman test to decide whether to use either fixed effects or 
random effects.  While the fixed effect model assumes that the unobserved country 
variables are correlated with the included regressors, the random effects assume that 
the unobserved country variables are random and hence not correlated with the other 
regressors. If the assumption that those unique individual effects are random hold, 
then both the random effects and fixed effects are consistent, but random effects is 
22 
 
more efficient. But if the omitted individual effects are correlated with the other 
included regressors, the random effects are inconsistent but the fixed effect is 
consistent. The Hausman test therefore is based on the idea that under the null that 
the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors, the estimates from 
random effects should not differ systematically from that of fixed effect. With a 
significant P-value (0.03) in my case, the estimates from the random effects are 
statistically different from those of the fixed effects and therefore, the fixed effect is 
picked over random effects.  
A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, and a Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in panel data indicate the presence of both heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation (Table 2.3, column 2). The modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity, which is distributed as a chi-square, tests for heteroskeadisticity 
across units.  In this study, I test each regressor individually, and all the regressors 
were found to be responsible for heteroskedasticity.  
The Woodridge test for autocorrelation in a linear panel is a test for first 
order autocorrelation.  The Woodridge serial correlation test in a linear panel is done 
by first regressing the first difference of the dependent variable on the first difference 
of the regressors. The residuals obtained from this regression are regressed on its 
first lag. If there is no serial correlation, the correlation between the residual and its 
lag is expected to be -0.5, so the Woodridge serial correlation test, essentially tests 
whether the coefficient on the lagged residual is equal to -0.5. The initial test shows 
the presence of at least first order autocorrelation. 
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Given the results of these preliminary tests, I estimate my model with fixed 
effect Generalized Least squares that allows for common AR (1) process and country 
specific error variances.  
2.4 Discussion of Results 
Table 2.3 shows the results for the baseline regressions where only countries 
with at least ten years of data availability are included in the sample. Columns 1 and 
2 report the results, when OLS with country fixed effects are used. Columns 3 and 4 
however show the result when feasible GLS is used to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation identified in the fixed effect regressions. The 
coefficients of the regressors from fixed effect estimation did not change much from 
that of the feasible GLS, though the standard errors changed. In addition, inflation is 
insignificant in the feasible GLS estimation but significant in the OLS (with country 
fixed effect) estimation. I use feasible GLS (columns 3 and 4) as the reference of my 
discussion because of the reasons stated above.  
It can be seen from Table 2.3 (column 3) that none of the macroeconomic 
variables (GDP per capita and inflation) are significant in influencing FDI inflow. 
Inflation rate being insignificant in affecting FDI inflow to developing countries is 
consistent with the results of Asiedu (2002) which also found similar results 
concerning determinants of FDI inflow to developing countries. Perhaps GDP per 
capita is insignificant in affecting FDI flow to developing countries because market 
size is not a key determinant of FDI flow to developing countries since income levels 
are relatively low. FDI inflow to developing countries may come about as a result of 
taking advantage of cheap inputs. Edwards (1990) who examined the determinants of 
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FDI flow to 58 developing countries between 1971-1981, also found real per capita 
GDP to be insignificant in attracting FDI. GDP per capita may be significant for 
horizontal FDI, which is mostly market seeking. Since in this study, the dependent 
variable is made up of both horizontal and vertical FDI, that may explain why GDP 
per capita is insignificant. I find economic infrastructure like the presence of 
telephone lines, to be positively related to FDI inflows to developing countries. 
Wheeler and Moody (1992) also found that infrastructure quality is positively 
correlated with the US FDI flow to other countries.  
With respect to the institutional (or policy) variables, the investment profile 
and government stability are significant in affecting FDI inflow to developing 
countries.
9
 This is very important because the investment profile clearly signifies 
how receptive the recipient country is to FDI inflow. This result is consistent with 
Asiedu (2006), who also reports a positive impact of investment profile on FDI flow 
to Africa between 1984 and 2000, and  Singh and Jun (1995) who show a positive 
relationship between business operating conditions and FDI flow to 31 developing 
countries between 1970 and 1993. Government stability is important since 
government instability may create a state of uncertainty, especially with respect to 
investment policies. The Law and order variable is important because it measures 
how the law is efficiently enforced resulting in civil order. Thus, a stable government 
is associated with higher FDI inflow. 
                                                          
9
 The institutional variables are not that highly correlated with the largest correlation of 0.68 occurring 
between internal conflict and law and order. The results do not change when I enter each of the 
institutional variables (law and order, investment profile, bureaucratic quality, corruption, and internal 
conflict) one at a time. Also a composite institutional variable (i.e. political risk rating index) used 
comes out positive and significant. 
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None of the political conflict variables (coups, riots and assassinations) is 
significant.
10
 A joint significance test for the three political conflict variables as a 
group also shows that they are jointly insignificant (as indicated by a Chi-square of 
1.77). This is also consistent with some of the results found in the literature. For 
instance Asiedu (2002), using the average of the number of assassinations and  
revolutions to measure political risk, also finds political stability to be insignificant 
with respect to FDI flow to developing countries. Loree and Guisinger (1995) reports 
similar results. 
Finally, with respect to natural resources, non-manufactured exports as a 
percentage of overall merchandised exports are found to be significant and 
negatively associated with FDI inflows into developing countries. This result can be 
explained by the fact that it is only in Africa that it has been reported that most of the 
FDI inflows go to the primary sector. In fact in Asia, the service and the 
manufacturing sectors are the leading sectors in attracting FDI. In WIR (2010) it was 
noted that a new trend in FDI to Africa is emerging, where even though the primary 
sector, still continues to attract FDI in terms of values, manufacturing sector 
accounted for about 41% of the total number of Greenfield investment projects 
between 2003-2009. For the same period it is reported in WIR (2010) that the service 
sector has been the leading sector in attracting FDI in both Asia, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It is therefore not surprising that natural resources will be 
                                                          
10
 None of the conflict variables (coups, riots and assassinations) is significant even when I enter each 
of them one at a time. Also weighted average conflict index (which is weighted average of the number 
of Assassinations, the number of General Strikes, the number of Guerrilla Warfare, the number of 
Government Crises, the number of Purges, the number of Revolutions, and the number of Anti-
Government Demonstrations) also comes out insignificant. 
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negatively associated with FDI inflow to developing countries (since two-thirds of 
my sample is outside of SSA). I also show below that while non-manufactured 
exports maintain its significant negative sign in the sample of non SSA countries, it 
is insignificant in the sample of SSA countries.  
2.4.1 Determinants of FDI inflow to Sub-Saharan Africa 
Column 4 of Table 2.3 shows the results when I include the interaction of 
sub-Sahara Africa dummy with other regressors. From the top panel of column 4 of 
Table 2.3, one can see that the results are similar to that of column 3. However 
unlike in column 3 where non-manufactured exports are negative and significant, in 
column 4, fuel exports as a percentage of exports is significant and negative. This 
clearly shows that non-SSA developing countries have natural resources as being 
negatively related to FDI inflow. In sum, physical infrastructure, natural resources, 
government stability and investment are significant in affecting FDI inflow to 
countries outside of SSA. 
The bottom half of column 4 of Table 2.3 shows the results for SSA dummy 
interacted variables. The F-test for the joint significance of the SSA interacted 
variables, shows that they are significantly different from zero as a group. The only 
SSA interacted variables that are significant are fuel exports as percentage of total 
merchandised exports and number of telephone subscribers. This indicates that other 
than the fuel exports, and telephone subscribers, the variables that affect FDI inflow 
to SSA are not different from those that affect FDI flow to outside the region. Table 
2.4 calculates the coefficients of the right-hand side variables for the sub-Sahara 
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African countries in our sample. To calculate the coefficients for the determinants of 
FDI inflow to sub-Saharan African countries, we sum the coefficient on the variable 
without the SSA dummy interaction and the coefficient of the same variable 
interacted with a dummy variable for SSA.  Note that all calculations use coefficients 
from column 4 of Table 2.3. For instance, to find the coefficient on telephone 
subscribers, we add the first coefficient of telephone, without the dummy interaction 
(0.010), to its interactive term (0.028) to get 0.038. The coefficients for non-SSA 
tropical countries in column 2 of Table 2.4 are shown for comparison‟s sake.  
Table 2.4 shows some of the differences and similarities in the determinants 
of FDI to SSA region and non-SSA regions. The results are as the following: First, 
though physical infrastructure is significant in affecting FDI flow to all developing 
regions, it has a relatively more impact on FDI inflow to SSA (due to relatively 
larger coefficient of 0.038 compared to 0.010 for non SSA region) For instance, 
while a one percent increase in the number of telephones will increase FDI to SSA 
by 3.8%, FDI flow to non SSA regions will increase by only one percent. If SSA 
increases its average telephone subscribers from 16.76 (per 1000 people) to that of 
Honduras (30.91), the median country, SSA‟s FDI share of GDP will increase by 
about 3.2%. In the same way, if Uganda with an average telephone of 2.35 increases 
its average telephone levels to that of Honduras, Uganda‟s FDI share of GDP will 
increase by about 46.2%.
11
 Second, while natural resources (i.e. fuel exports) are 
                                                          
11
 With telephone coefficient of 0.038 (Table 3 column 1), the increase in FDI/GDP for SSA as a 
result of SSA increasing its telephone subscribers to that of the median country (Honduras) is 
calculated as: {[(30.91 -16.76)/16.76)]*100}*0.038 = 3.2%. In the same way, the increase in 
Uganda‟s FDI/GDP is calculated as: {[(30.91 – 2.35)/2.35]*100}*0.038 = 46.2%. 
28 
 
positively associated with FDI inflow to SSA, it is negatively associated with FDI 
inflow to areas outside of SSA. This clearly confirms the argument that the primary 
sector is key in attracting FDI to Africa. Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) also found 
that fuel export as a percentage of total exports are positively associated with FDI to 
Africa. Finally government stability and investment profile affect FDI flow to all 
developing countries with the same effect. The investment profile and government 
stability has the largest economic significance in attracting FDI inflow to developing 
countries. If government stability and investment profile in developing countries 
increase by one index point each, net FDI inflow per GDP to developing countries 
will increase by 5.9% and 7.3% respectively.
12
 
The results is different from the findings of Asiedu (2002) in the sense that 
while she finds improved physical infrastructure to enhance FDI flow to non SSA 
region, and have no effect on FDI flow to SSA, I find physical infrastructure to affect 
FDI flow to all developing countries and even have more impact on FDI flow to 
SSA. The difference in results may be due to different methodology I use, pooled 
feasible GLS. 
2.4.2 Robustness Check 
The results may be sensitive to the countries selected and may not reflect the 
determinants of FDI in countries outside this sample of 56 countries. To find out 
whether the results are sensitive to the dataset, I increase the sample size from 56 to 
                                                          
12
 The coefficients for government stability and investment profile are 0.059 and 0.073 respectively 
(Table 3) The increase in FDI as a result of government stability increasing by one index point is 
calculated as: 0.058 * 100 = 7.8%. Likewise increase in FDI flow due to investment profile increasing 
by one index point is calculated as: 0.073*100 = 7.3%.  
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77 countries by including all countries with at least 5 years of observation, unlike the 
baseline dataset, which only includes countries with at least 10 years of observation.  
Table 2.5 reports the results for the second sample where all developing 
countries with at least five years of data availability are included. The results are 
similar to that of the baseline sample (Table 2.3). In the main regression (column 3 
of Table 2.5), like in the baseline results (Table 2.3, column 3), while telephone, 
government stability, and conducive investment environment are positively 
associated with FDI inflow to developing countries, non manufactured exports are 
negatively associated  with FDI inflow to developing countries. In addition to these 
variables, now law and order is positively associated with FDI inflow. Column 4 of 
Table 2.5 again reports the results when the SSA dummy is interacted with the 
regressors. All the variables that are significant in affecting FDI inflow to non SSA 
countries are also significant in this second dataset. In Table 2.6 (column 1), I 
calculate the determinants of FDI inflow to SSA countries. Like my baseline results, 
fuel exports and physical infrastructure are positively associated with FDI flow to 
SSA. In addition GDP per capita and lower corruption are positively associated with 
FDI inflow to SSA. These additional variables become significant due to increase in 
the sample size to include eight SSA countries which have relatively lower GDP per 
capita and lower index of corruption (i.e. pervasive corruption).
13
In fact, the 
inclusion of those eight SSA countries reduced the average of GDP per capita and 
corruption index for SSA from 2380.15 and 2.57 to 1849 and 2.53 respectively. It 
seems that, below certain threshold, corruption and GDP per capita becomes 
                                                          
13
 The eight additional SSA countries are Republic of Congo, Cote D‟Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, and Tanzania. 
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significant in affecting FDI flow to SSA. In other words, when corruption index, and 
GDP per capita are below a certain level, investors become concerned when 
investing in SSA. 
The results can be summarized as follows; (1) Infrastructure, government 
stability and good investment climate are positively correlated with FDI inflow to 
developing countries; (2) While natural resources proxied by fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandised exports, is negatively related to FDI to non-SSA 
developing countries, it is positively related to FDI inflows to SSA; (3) Finally, GDP 
per capita and corruption become positively associated with FDI flow to SSA when 
their averages fall below certain level. 
2.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
In this study, I examine the determinants of FDI to developing countries, and 
test whether the traditional FDI determinants have the same effects on FDI to Africa 
as they have on non-African developing countries. To determine if the results are 
robust to different samples of countries, I also use a second larger sample, which is 
made up of countries with at least five years of data availability, contrary to the first 
sample where only countries with at least 10 years of data are included.  
Using Generalized Least squares with country fixed effects, I show that 
infrastructural quality, good investment climate and government stability are 
positively correlated with FDI. Also I find that while natural resources (measured 
here by fuel exports) are positively associated with FDI flow to SSA, it is negatively 
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associated with FDI flow to non-SSA region. Finally, below certain level, GDP per 
capita and corruption are positively associated with FDI flow to SSA.  
As far as policy recommendation is concerned, for SSA to increase its global 
share of FDI, it should strive to maintain stable government, create a conducive 
investment climate, with respect to profits repatriation, and payment delays, and 
improve its physical infrastructure. Reducing corruption level and growing their 
economy will also increase FDI flow to SSA.  
A possible extension to this work would be to further investigate a couple of 
countries where one will be able to do an in depth analysis of the sources of the FDI 
and the determinants of FDI originating from developing countries separately from 
those emanating from developed countries. A study of this nature will be able to 
offer a tailored policy recommendation for different countries depending on whether 
a country‟s FDI is dominated by those from developing countries or those from 
developed countries. This is very important because a study by Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc (2008) argue and show that developing country Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) thrive better, relative to their developed country counterparts, in countries 
with adverse institutions. Their argument is that since most of the developing country 
TNCs are used to weak institutions in their domestic countries, they are able to turn 
the “disadvantage” of adverse institutions into an “advantage”, in the sense of 
competitive advantage over the TNCs from developed countries, which are not used 
to dealing with adverse institutions. If this position and findings by Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc (2008) is anything to go by, then one will expect this new trend of FDI 
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inflow from other developing countries to Africa to persist. The findings by Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc (2008) that South-South FDI may flourish even when the host 
countries‟ institutions are not developed, unlike the North-South FDI flow is both 
reassuring and worrying.  It is reassuring because it gives developing countries with 
weak institutions some hope that they can still attract FDI inflow, especially from 
other developing countries. On the contrary, availability of FDI flow even in the 
presence of weak institutions may also not encourage host countries to develop their 
institutions to attract FDI inflow. Another implication of this results is that lumping 
all countries together, in a cross sectional studies, without knowing the source of 
their FDI inflow may give erroneous results especially with respect to institutional 
variables. This is because while strong institutions may be negatively associated with 














Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the First Sample (Countries with at least 10 
years of data) 
 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
FDI 1.871 2.279 -12.208 12.885 
Fuel Exports  16.327 26.221 0.0001 99.657 
Non Manufactured Exports 63.327 26.987 7.093 99.978 
Telephones Lines 64.605 69.746 1.336 364.981 
GDPPC 4051.861 2513.279 476.174 12890.25 
Inflation  86.580 698.817 -23.479 13611.63 
Political Risk Rating Index 58.821 11.240 26.417 81.667 
Investment 6.523 1.963 1.167 11.5 
Law and Order 3.001 1.146 0 6 
Corruption 2.691 0.961 0 6 
Government Stability 7.335 2.254 1 12 
Internal Conflict 7.957 2.500 0 12 
Bureaucratic Quality 1.789 0.849 0 4 
Weighted Conflict 1356.6 2211.6 0 21250 
Coups  0.008 0.089 0 1 
Riots 0.534 1.684 0 26 
Assassinations 0.491 1.667 0 26 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for the Second sample (Countries with at least 5 
years of data) 
 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
FDI 2.194 3.087 -12.208 45.150 
Fuel Exports  16.942 26.688 0.0001 99.657 
Non Manufactured Exports 64.808 26.620 7.093 99.977 
Telephones Lines 69.820 76.103 1.336 364.981 
GDPPC 3933.9 2527.008 476.174 12890.25 
Inflation  76.859 651.030 -29.173 13611.63 
Political Risk Rating Index 59.144 10.785 26.417 81.667 
Investment 6.542 1.956 1.167 11.5 
Law and Order 3.098 1.147 0 6 
Corruption 2.639 0.964 0 6 
Government Stability 7.544 2.262 0 12 
Internal Conflict 8.081 2.405 0 12 
Bureaucratic Quality 1.748 0.845 0 4 
Weighted Conflict 1244.3 2109.297 0 21250 
Coups  0.009 0.097 0 1 
Riots 0.481 1.582 0 26 







TABLE 2.3: Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation 
 1 2 3 4 



















































































































































































No. of Observation 996 996 996 996 
No. of Countries 55 55 55 55 
R-Square(Within) 0.23 0.26   
F-Test for OLS vs. Fixed 
effect (5%, 53, 930) 
7.60    
Hausman Test (P-Value) 0.03    
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity    




Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation (F-Stat – 
1, 54) 
15.971 17.864   
Joint Significance test for 
the Political Instability 
Variables    
  1.77 1.39 
Joint Significance test for 
Africa interacted 
variables    
   25.84 
The values in parentheses are robust t-statistics and Z-values (for GLS regressions).  ***, ** and * 

















TABLE 2.4: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) vs. Non Sub-Saharan Africa 

























































The values in parentheses are Z-values (for GLS regressions).  ***, ** and * indicate statistical 













TABLE 2.5:  Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation for Alternative Dataset 
 1 2 3 4 



















































































































































































No. of Observation 1151 1151 1151 1151 
No. of Countries 76 76 76 76 
R-Square(Within) 0.15 0.17   
F-Test for OLS vs. Fixed 
effect (5%, 53, 1125) 
7.60    
Hausman Test (P-Value) 0.03    
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity    




Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation (F-Stat – 
1, 75) 
8.72 9.23   
Joint Significance test for 
the Political Instability 
Variables    
  0.82 2.54 
Joint Significance test for 
Africa interacted 
variables    
   41.77 
The values in parentheses are robust t-statistics, and Z-values (GLS regressions).  ***, ** and * 

























TABLE 2.6: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) vs. Non SSA for Alternative Dataset 
 

























































The values in parentheses are Z-values (for GLS regressions).  ***, ** and * indicate statistical 




















Appendix 2.1: Data Description and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
FDI Net Foreign Direct investment as a 




Fuel Exports  Fuel exports as a percentage of total 






This is calculated as 100 minus 
manufactured exports as a percentage 




Telephones Lines Fixed lines and mobile phone 




GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
in 2000 constant international $ with 









The political risk rating index which 
is made up of Government Stability, 
Socioeconomic Conditions, 
Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, 
External conflict, Corruption, 
Military in politics, Religious 
tensions, Law and order, Ethnic 
Tensions, Democratic 





Investment Profile This has subcomponents of Contract 
Viability/Expropriation, Profits 
Repatriation, and Payment Delays. 
The composite score has a minimum 
score of 0 (More risk) and a 




Law and Order This has two sub-components: Law, 
and Order, with a composite score 
ranging between 0 (Less Law and 




Corruption This measures corruption in the 
political system (i.e. public 
corruption). The composite score 







Government Stability This index has a subcomponents of 
government Unity, Legislative 
strength, and popular support. The 
index ranges from 0 (less stable) to 




Internal Conflict This index is made up of civil 
war/coup threat, terrorism/political 
violence, and civil disorder. The 
index ranges from 0 (more internal 





Bureaucratic Quality This measures how the bureaucracy 
is robust to changes in government. 




Weighted Conflict The weighted conflict index is 
calculated in the following manner: 
Multiply the value of the number of 
Assassinations by 24, General Strikes 
by 43, Guerrilla Warfare by 46, 
Government Crises by 48, 
Purges by 86, Riots by 102, 
Revolutions by 148, Anti-
Government Demonstrations by 200. 
Sum the 8 weighted values and 




Coups  The number of Coups d‟état. Coup is 
defined as extra constitutional or 
forced changes in the top government 
elite and /or its effective control of 





Riots The number of Riots per year. Riots 
is defined as any violent 
demonstration or clash of more than 
100 citizens involving the use of 
physical force 
Cross-National 
Time Series Data 
Assassinations The number of assassinations per 
year. Assassination is defined as any 
politically motivated murder or 
attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician. 
Cross-National 





Appendix 2.2: List of Countries and years of Data Availability 
Countries Region Period of Data 
Availability for 
countries with at 
least ten years of 
Data Availability 
Period of Data 
Available for 
Countries with at 
least five years of 
data availability 
Albania Europe & Central 
Asia 
1996-2004 1996-2004 
Algeria Middle East & 
North Africa 
1984-2004 1984-2004 
Argentina Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Armenia Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1999-2004 
Azerbaijan Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1999-2005 




Belarus Europe & Central 
Asia  
 1998-2005 
Bolivia Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Brazil Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2004 1984-2004 
Bulgaria Europe & Central 
Asia 
1996-2005 1996-2005 











Chile  Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
China East Asia & 
Pacific 
1984-2005 1984 – 2005 
Colombia Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2004 1984-2004 




Costa Rica Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Cote D‟Ivoire Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 1985; 1995-2000; 
2002-2003. 
Dominican Latin America & 1986-88; 1992-97; 1986-88; 1992-97; 
43 
 
Republic the Caribbean 2001 2001 
Ecuador Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2004 1984-2004 
Egypt Middle East & 
North Africa 
1984-2004 1984-2004 





 1993; 1995; 1997; 
2001-2003 





















Guyana Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
 1997-2005 
Honduras Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
India South Asia 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Indonesia  East Asia & 
Pacific 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Iran  Middle East & 
North Africa 
 1997-2005 
Jamaica  Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2002; 2004 1984-2002; 2004 
















Lebanon  Middle East & 
North Africa 
 1997-2004 
Lithuania Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1999-2004 
Madagascar  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1990-2004 1990-2004 










Mali  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 1996-2001 
Mexico Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Moldova Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1999-2005 
Mongolia  East Asia & 
Pacific 
1996-2005 1996-2005 
















Niger  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 1995-2003 










Panama Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 












Peru Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Philippines  East Asia & 
Pacific 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Romania Europe & Central 
Asia 
1990-2005 19909-2005 
Russian Federation Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1996-2004 






South Africa Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1984; 1992-2005 1984; 1992-2005 


















Tanzania  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 1997-2004 












Tunisia  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1984-2004 1984-2004 






Ukraine Europe & Central 
Asia 
 1998-2004 
Uruguay  Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Venezuela Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Vietnam East Asia & 
Pacific 
 1997-2003 
Rep. of Yemen Middle East & 
North Africa 
1991; 1995-2004 1991; 1995-2004 
Zambia Sub-Saharan 
Africa 



























Much of the initial optimism about development economics in the early post-
war II period, and the faith in the discipline‟s ability to spur economic growth and 
eliminate poverty, has now been replaced with a greater recognition of the 
complexity and difficulty involved in such an undertaking.  Wolfgang Sachs notes 
that in the 1950s, Development took on an active meaning: it turned into a project of 
planners and engineers who set out to systematically remodel societies to accelerate 
maturation–a project to be completed within several decades, if not years.
15
  More 
than 50 years later, the literature has turned to identifying the reasons for why 
development is so hard.  Are there intractable factors in poor countries that thwart 
our well-intentioned attempts to spur growth?     
One possible factor that has gained increasing traction in the development 
literature is that of geography. Jared Diamond‟s Guns, Germs, and Steel 
hypothesizes that agricultural communities first began in the Fertile Crescent and 
that the technology created in this region spread easily East to West across Europe.  
It did not, however, spread well across the North-South axis.  Tropical countries in 
Africa have significantly different climatic and soil conditions, making the adoption 
of temperate technology difficult.  Bloom and Sachs (1998) build on this idea and 
detail what aspects of tropical soils make agricultural productivity difficult.  Since 
                                                          
14
 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Robin Grier. I am grateful for her 
guidance and support. 
15
 Indeed, Sachs argues that, the South has ceased to be seen as „young‟ and „full of potential‟ like in 
Truman‟s time, but rather as the breeding ground of social and environmental turbulence.   
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almost all of the rich countries are located in temperate zones, and that is where most 
of the R&D takes place, most new technology will also be best suited for those 
climatic zones.  In that way, the literature suggests that a very early geographic 
disadvantage has put Africa on a path-dependent trajectory of low growth and 
poverty. 
There is reason for optimism, though, in that there are good arguments (and 
evidence) that tropical climates are not destined to be less agriculturally productive.   
First, the Green Revolution, which represented some of the biggest technological 
advances in agriculture in the post-WWII period, first took place in a tropical 
country (India) and with respect to a tropical crop (rice).  Second, biologists have 
cast doubt on whether tropical soils are as disadvantaged as economists have made it 
seem. Third, a recent report by the U.S. based Oakland Institute shows how many 
developed countries and Universities like Harvard University, through hedge funds 
in the U.K. are buying large tracts of land in Africa for agricultural purposes. For 
instance the report indicates that Chinese government already owns about eight 
million hectares of land in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while privately owned 
companies like the British bioenergy giant, Crest Global Green, holding deeds to 
about 900,000 hectares of land in Mali, Guinea, and Senegal.
16
 This clearly gives 
credence to the fact that tropical climate and its soils may not be that of a hindrance 
to agricultural productivity. Finally, good policy can negate a lot of the ill effects of 
bad geography.  As a prime example, Brazil has made huge strides in recent years in 
transforming tropical soils and vastly raised their agricultural yields.  In sum, it is not 
                                                          
16




clear that low agricultural productivity is the geographical destiny of tropical 
countries.  
In this chapter, we investigate the determinants of tropical agricultural 
productivity in a panel of 27 tropical developing countries across several regions for 
the years 1984 to 2005.  We examine the role that institutions, government policies, 
traditional inputs, and infrastructure play in explaining differences in agricultural 
productivity across tropical countries, and whether the effect of these variables is 
significantly different in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
In the full sample, we find that fertilizer consumption, the number of 
telephone subscribers (both mainline and cell phones), rainfall, and irrigation are 
important to agricultural productivity. However, institutional variables, bureaucratic 
quality, government stability, and corruption, are all insignificant in the full sample.  
When we construct interaction variables to test whether the effect of these variables 
are different in SSA, we find some interesting results.  First, fertilizer consumption, 
telephones, and rainfall have a positive and significant impact on agricultural 
productivity across regions. Second, the coefficients on tractor usage and the 
institutional variables are insignificant.  Last, irrigation has a positive and significant 
effect outside of tropical SSA, but no significant effect within the region. Expanding 
our sample by using an alternative measure of tropicality yields very similar results. 
The main differences are that the effect of rainfall is now only significant in tropical 
SSA, and two of the institutional variables are weakly significant. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses in more detail the 
argument that tropical agriculture faces significantly more obstacles than temperate 
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agriculture, as well as pointing to some reasons why these obstacles may not be as 
great as once thought. Section 3.3 examines the data and empirical methodology 
used in this chapter. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Tropical Agricultural Productivity 
Sachs (2001) and Gallup et al. (2000) argue that agriculture in tropical 
regions faces four main obstacles.  First, farmers in tropical countries have bigger 
problems on average in securing adequate water for crops, an especially important 
point because the absence of frost in tropical climates tends to dry out topsoil. The 
arid tropics make agricultural production difficult without irrigation but the lack of 
abundant rainfall makes irrigation very expensive.  In the humid tropics, however, 
farmers face a different problem: dry seasons combined with periodic torrential rains 
that leach important nutrients from the soil.   
Second, the humid tropics are also characterized with a persistent cloud cover 
that can prevent crops from receiving enough sunlight for photosynthesis. In the 
summer, the temperate regions enjoy relatively longer days than the tropics, thus 
enhancing photosynthetic activity. Third, the tropics, with their humid climatic 
conditions and lack of freezing temperatures, are also conducive for pest growth, 
including diseases like trypanosomiasis and malaria, which negatively impact human 
productivity and livestock production. 
Lastly, technological innovations in temperate zone agriculture may not be 
easily imported or adapted to tropical conditions as most agricultural R&D takes 
place in the developed world and is thus focused on temperate climate technology. 
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Arends-Kuening and Makundi (2000) argue that countries located in the tropics 
might not benefit much from the emergence of agricultural biotechnology from the 
temperate regions unless the tropical countries‟ priorities, as far as crops are 
concerned, coincide with that of the inventing (temperate) countries.   
McMillan and Masters (2000) analyze tropical climate agriculture from a 
political economy perspective.  They argue that tropical countries are more likely to 
have productivity-inhibiting policies, such as high taxes on agricultural products and 
low public agricultural R&D expenditure, than temperate ones. These policies persist 
even though the literature clearly shows that they lead to low agricultural 
productivity and lower average economic growth. McMillan and Masters explain 
that tropical climatic conditions are conducive for the cultivation of perennial tree 
crops like coffee and cocoa, and slow maturing plants, like cassava, sugar, and 
bananas. These crops tend to have high sunk costs and long gestation periods, 
making it economically efficient for policymakers to impose adverse policies when 
the large sunk costs have already been incurred by farmers. Since the farmers are 
aware of what the policymaker will do once the sunk cost is incurred, they withhold 
new investment. McMillan and Masters contend that the only way out of this bad 
equilibrium is a credible commitment from policymakers that they will pursue 
growth-enhancing policies (i.e. low agricultural taxes and high R&D). Temperate 
climates, on the other hand, support annual crops with short gestation periods and 
lower sunk costs. Given that, farmers in the temperate region can easily retaliate 
against unexpected adverse policy, giving governments an incentive to maintain low 
taxes and high R&D policies.   
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In sum, researchers have put forth an impressive array of arguments for why 
agricultural productivity would be expected to be lower in tropical climates.  On the 
other hand, there are reasons for optimism.  On the biological side, some researchers 
deny the characterization of tropical soils as being significantly disadvantaged 
compared to temperate ones. Sanchez (2001), for example, shows that the percentage 
of total land area that can be considered fertile in tropical regions is no different from 
that of the temperate region. Further, the proportion of fertile soils with sufficient 
rainfall and no permafrost are roughly equal in both regions.  While temperate 
regions receive more solar radiation during the cropping season, the tropics have 
approximately twice the potential in crop production because farmers have the 
possibility of growing more than one crop per year.   
There are other reasons to believe that tropical agricultural is not doomed to 
low productivity.  Brazil has emerged as an innovator in tropical agricultural 
innovation and has successfully overcome a lot of the obstacles that seemed inherent 
to tropical soils.  In addition, one of the biggest technological advances in agriculture 
involved the growing of rice, a tropical crop, in India. The Green Revolution makes 
it clear that there is more to differential agricultural productivity than climate. While 
many Asian countries were able to take advantage of the Green Revolution, African 
countries have been less successful in incorporating technological innovations.
17
 
The success of some tropical agricultural regions suggests that perhaps 
tropical soils are not as big an obstacle to development as we once believed.  Or 
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 See Johnson et al. (2003) for an excellent investigation into the reasons that the Green Revolution 
has not taken hold in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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perhaps climate is not fate; that is, with the right amount of infrastructure, good 
policies, and research and development, tropical soils can be just as productive as 
temperate ones.  Also, the success of some of these tropical countries also imply that 
there may be some applicable technology that other tropical countries in Africa can 
adapt to their individual agricultural circumstance.
18
    
Typically, when economists argue that climate is a barrier to development, 
they are talking about Sub-Saharan Africa.  In this chapter, we study the 
determinants of agricultural productivity in a sample limited to tropical, developing 
countries.  If tropical climates really are to blame for low agricultural productivity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, then agriculture in those countries should not be significantly 
different than that in other tropical and developing countries.   If there are other 
factors important to productivity, then limiting the sample to tropical countries 
allows us to better identify what they are. Climate is no longer obscuring the issue.
19
 
3.3 Data and Econometric Methodology 
We study the determinants of tropical agricultural productivity in a panel of 
27 tropical developing countries for the years 1984 to 2005. Appendix 3.1 provides a 
list of the countries in the sample as well as the years for which we have data. The 
data is annual but is not available for all countries for the entire period. This period 
was chosen because of constraints on data availability, but it is also an important 
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 Otsuka and Kijima (2010) argue, for instance, that in order for Africa to transform its agricultural 
sector, countries should concentrate on a crop like rice, where there is readily available technology 
from Asia and Latin America. 
19
 Most other papers investigating agricultural productivity in Africa do so only in the context of a 
particular country or panel of countries in Africa.  We extend the sample to other regions, but do so 
with the condition that the dominant climate be tropical. 
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period to examine.  Recent papers find that SSA agricultural productivity blossomed 
during the mid-1980s and early 2000s after experiencing negative growth in the 
preceding two decades (Block, 1994 and 2010; Nin-Pratt and Yu, 2008; and Fulginiti 
et al., 2004).   
Our baseline sample of countries was chosen using the well-known Koeppen 
Geiger (KG) climatic classification, which has been digitized by Strahler and 
Strahler (1992). In the KG climatic classification, there are three tropical zones: 
Equatorial rainforest (Af), Equatorial monsoon (Am), and Equatorial savannah with 
dry winter (Aw).  In this chapter, we classify a country as tropical if at least 75% of 
its land area falls in the tropics.
20
 This classification gives us a sample of 27 
countries, consisting of 13 sub-Saharan African countries, 5 Asian, and 9 from Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
As a robustness test, we later experiment with using an alternative 
classification of tropical climate.  Masters and McMillan (2001) categorize countries 
with an average of at least five days per month of frost in winter as temperate, and 
those with fewer than five days of winter frost days as tropical.  Using this 
classification almost doubles our sample size to 53 countries, with 27 and 18 
countries respectively coming from SSA, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
remaining 8 countries come from the Middle East and North Africa (3 countries) and 
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 We understand that using 75% of the land area as a cut off for classifying tropical countries may be 
arbitrary but using only countries with their whole land area (100%) in the tropics reduced the number 
of countries drastically, making it difficult to undertake any cross-country analysis.  
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Our dependent variable is net agricultural production (in 1,000 international 
dollars) divided by total arable and permanent cropland (in thousands of hectares). 
Both variables are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization‟s statistical 
division (FAOSTAT).   
Our independent variables include traditional agricultural inputs, 
infrastructure, measures of the quality of governance, the rule of law, and the general 
economic environment.
22
 The traditional agricultural inputs include fertilizer 
consumption and tractor usage. We measure the former with data from the World 
Bank that computes the sum of nitrogenous, potash & phosphate (in metric tons) 
used per unit of arable land. Tractor usage is simply the number of tractors used per 
100 square kilometers of arable land. This variable is included because it proxies for 
differences in agricultural technology across countries.  
As noted by Block (2010), however, these inputs may suffer from 
measurement errors. For instance, the variable measuring the amount of agricultural 
land a country has does not account for the quality of this land, a factor that is 
obviously very important to agricultural productivity. Jorgenson and Griliches 
(1967) demonstrated that these measurement errors can be mitigated by including 
                                                          
21
 Jamaica is not listed in Masters et al. 2001, probably due to lack of data on frost days for Jamaica, 
but we decided to include it as a tropical country since Jamaica definitely will have average frost days 
of less than five. 
22
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give summary statistics of the variables, and appendix 3.1gives a detailed 
description of the variables, and their sources. 
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variables that control for land quality. For that reason, we include total irrigated land 
as a percentage of total cropland, and annual rainfall based on the crop-weighted 
scheme of Ramankutty and Foley (1998), to measure agricultural land quality.
23
 
These traditional inputs have been widely used in the empirical literature studying 
agricultural productivity (see, for example, Nkamleu et al., 2003; Lusiga et al., 1997; 
Alene et al. 2009; and Fulginiti et al., 2004).  We expect that these inputs will all 
have a positive impact on agricultural productivity.  
It is possible that some countries are better able to take advantage of 
technological breakthroughs because they have invested more in rural infrastructure. 
The lack of infrastructure can be a large obstacle to efficient markets in poor 
countries.  In the case of agriculture, communication and transportation systems help 
in the timely transportation of harvests to urban areas, which serve as secondary 
markets for agricultural produce. Rosegrant and Hazell (2001) argue that the Green 
Revolution worked so well in India at least in part due to the important increase in 
public investment before and during the period in question.  Much of this investment 
was in road construction, electrification, and irrigation.  Rosegrant and Perez (1997) 
point to a lack of irrigation as one reason that Africa has had trouble replicating the 
Green Revolution.  They note that because medium and large-scale irrigation costs 
more than three times what it does in South Asia, less than 4% of agricultural areas 
were irrigated in the 1990s.
24
  To determine the effect of infrastructure on 
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 The annual rainfall based on crop-weighted scheme involves weighting rainfall data with weights 
based on prevalence of cropland. The detailed description of how the rainfall data is constructed can 
be found on: http://acadweb.swarthmore.edu/acad/rain-econ/Framesets/CountryAggregated.htm.  
24
 Johnson et al. (2003), p. 1212. 
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agricultural productivity, we include two measures:  the number of fixed line and 
mobile telephone subscribers (per 1,000 people) and total irrigated land as a 
percentage of total cropland.
25
 
Another reason that countries may be better placed to adopt new technology 
and raise agricultural output is because the structure and stability of their government 
is conducive for investment and growth.  As a proxy for good governance, we use 
three measures from the ICRG dataset:  government stability, corruption and 
bureaucratic quality.  The first measures overall political stability, the second 
measures official corruption, and the third is a measure of how the bureaucracy is 
able to function without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
service, especially during period of change in government. We choose these three 
political risk variables bearing in mind the important role well functioning stable 
government institutions can play, like the distribution of agricultural inputs (such as 
fertilizer, and seedlings), and undertaking and distributing agricultural technology, in 
improving agricultural productivity.  We expect all of these variables to be positively 
and significantly related to agricultural productivity.   
Some papers have shown that R&D expenditures are positively correlated 
with the increase in agricultural TFP in the mid-1980s in Sub-Saharan Africa (Block 
1994 and 2010; Alene, 2010). In particular, Block (1994) shows that about two-
thirds of the recovery of agricultural TFP in Sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by 
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 We also tried using rail lines (total km) and percentage of total roads paved to measure 
infrastructure, but not only did the inclusion of these variables halve our number of observations, both 
variables were consistently insignificant. 
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expenditures on agricultural R&D. We experimented with including a measure of 
R&D expenditures from the Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI), 
but found that it was consistently insignificant. Given that its inclusion reduces our 
sample of countries by one-third, we decided to drop it from the model.
26
   
Lastly, we also control for rainfall, which is measured as the average amount 
of rainfall per year weighted for the prevalence of cropland. This allows us to 
partially control for serious negative shocks to agriculture like droughts. 
Apart from the variables from the ICRG dataset (government stability, 
corruption, and bureaucratic quality), all of the variables are converted into natural 




We first estimate the determinants of tropical agricultural productivity, 
without including annual rainfall, and total irrigated land as a percentage of total 
cropland. We then estimate the same regression again, but for the years 1984-2000 
because the inclusion of annual rainfall and irrigation are only available for this 
shorter period. Finally, we estimate the same sets of regressions again, but this time 
we interact the regressors with a dummy variable equal to one for sub-Sahara 
African countries.  In this way, we are able to examine whether our variables affect 
agricultural productivity significantly different in sub-Saharan Africa than in other 
regions.  
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 R&D expenditures can be downloaded from the ASTI website at http://www.asti.cgiar.org/data/.  
27
 Fertilizer consumption, tractors, and the proportion of cropland that is irrigated were lagged one 
period to account for possible reverse causality. The results were not significantly different so we do 
not report them for reasons of space.  They are available by request from the authors.   
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All of our regressions are estimated with OLS and include country 
dummies.
28
 The standard errors are adjusted to be robust to possible 
heteroskedasticity, using country clustering. 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Baseline Model 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results using the Koeppen-Geiger (KG) climatic 
classification of tropical countries.  Column 1 of table 3.3 shows the results for the 
baseline regression for the period 1984-2005.  We re-estimate our baseline 
regression in Column 2 using this shorter sample, which allows us to effectively 
compare the results with those in Column 3, where we add rainfall and irrigation 
measures.  Note that the number of countries falls to 26, as there is no rainfall data 
available for Jamaica. The results are very similar in all the three columns of Table 
3.3, except that tractor usage is not significant when the sample size is shortened. 
With respect to agricultural inputs, we find that fertilizer consumption, the 
proportion of agricultural land that is irrigated, and rainfall are positive and 
significant at the .05, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. The finding that fertilizer 
consumption is positively related to agricultural output is consistent with Lusiga et 
al. (1997), who find that fertilizer usage positively affects agricultural productivity in 
a sample of 47 African countries from 1961-1991.  
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 We calculate joint f-tests on the country dummies and find that they are significant as a group in all 
of our estimations. We do not report the individual fixed effects for reasons of space, but the 
coefficients on them are generally relatively small, except for the case of Guyana, which has a much 




Rainfall is also an important factor in the tropics, since irrigation systems are 
often not sufficiently available in developing countries. It is therefore not surprising 
that higher annual rainfall is positively associated with higher agricultural 
productivity. Also, adequate rainfall may increase the length of time in which a land 
is cultivated before it is allowed to go fallow; adequate rainfall will also shorten the 
time a fallowed land will regain its lost nutrients.  Our results on rainfall are similar 
to Fulginiti et al. (2004), who found that the occurrence of droughts is negatively 
related to agricultural productivity in 41 sub-Saharan African countries. The 
proportion of agricultural land that is irrigated should also affect agricultural 
productivity in the same way as rainfall, if not more so because rainfall may be 
torrential and leach soil nutrients, while irrigation is more controlled.  
Of these three significant agricultural inputs, the proportion of agricultural 
land that is irrigated has the largest quantitative effect on agricultural productivity.  
Specifically, a one percent increase in the proportion of irrigated agricultural land is 
associated with about a 0.25% increase in agricultural production per hectare.  
We also find evidence that telephones and agricultural productivity are 
significantly related.  The coefficient on telephones is positive and significant at the 
.01 level in all three columns in the table. Using the coefficient from column 3, we 
calculate that a one percent increase in the number of telephone subscribers will 
increase agricultural productivity by about 0.08%. 
Unlike we expected, we find no evidence that tractor usage or institutional 
variables have a significant effect on agricultural productivity in the full sample.  
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Below we experiment with interacting our right-hand side variables with a dummy 
variable equal to one for countries located in tropical SSA. 
3.4.2 Determinants of Agricultural Productivity in tropical Sub-Saharan Africa 
Table 3.4 is similar to Table 3.3 except that we now interact all of our right-
hand side variables with a SSA dummy. An F-test of the joint significance of the 
SSA interaction variables shows that they are significantly different from zero as a 
group.
29
 This indicates that the determinants of tropical SSA agricultural productivity 
are different from that in tropical regions outside of SSA.  
Dividing the sample into tropical SSA and tropical non-SSA causes the 
coefficients of fertilizer use, telephones, and rainfall to become insignificant (on the 
variables by themselves as well as the ones interacted with the SSA dummy).  It is 
clear from this result that the effect of these variables on agricultural productivity is 
not significantly different in SSA.  The one variable that does change is irrigation.  
We find that in countries outside of Africa, irrigation positively and significantly 
affects productivity at the .01 level.  Inside tropical SSA, however, the variable has 
no significant effect.  When we calculate the partial effect on the interaction term 
(irrigation*SSA), we find that it has a coefficient of .096 and a t-statistic of 1.08.  
Thus, while irrigation has a clear positive impact on agriculture in most of the 
tropics, it does not in Africa.  
In sum, the results show fertilizer usage, telephones, and rainfall have 
positive and statistically significant effects throughout the tropical, developing 
                                                          
29  The F-statistic (8, 25) is equal to 3.44.  We experimented with estimating the model without 
country dummies and including a dummy variable equal to one for tropical SSA.  The coefficient on 




world. Tractor usage and some common institutional variables, however, do not 
seem to have a significant impact on agricultural productivity.  Lastly, irrigation has 
a mixed effect.  It positively affects productivity outside of Africa, but has not 
significant affect inside of tropical SSA. 
3.4.3 Robustness Check 
In this section, we test whether our results are robust to using an alternative 
classification of tropical countries. Specifically, we follow Masters et al. (2001) in 
designating countries as tropical if they have fewer than five days of winter frost 
days. As noted above, this new classification increased our baseline sample from 27 
to 53 countries. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 replicate the regressions reported in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 using this expanded sample. 
Table 3.5 reports the results for the overall sample. Here again our reference 
of discussion will be column 3, where we include annual rainfall and irrigation.  
Fertilizer usage, telephones, rainfall, and irrigation are all positively and significantly 
related to agricultural productivity at the .05, .01, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
Unlike in the earlier sample, however, we now find evidence that tractor usage and 
government stability affect productivity levels.   Both coefficients are positive and 
weakly significant at the .10 level, meaning that increased tractor usage and 
increased government stability are related to higher agricultural productivity.   
In Table 3.6, we interact our right-hand side variables with our SSA dummy.  
There are three main differences from Table 3.4.  First, rainfall no longer has a 
significant effect outside of tropical SSA.  It does, however, have positively impact 
agricultural productivity within Africa.  When we calculate the partial effect of the 
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interaction variable, we find that the coefficient is .223 and the t-statistic is 4.13.  
Thus, an increase in rainfall by 1% is associated with a .22% increase in 
productivity. 
Second, irrigation is now significantly related to agricultural productivity in 
SSA, but its quantitative impact is much smaller there than it is in other regions.  The 
coefficient on irrigation for countries outside of SSA is .415, which indicates that an 
increase in irrigation by 1% results in increased productivity of about .42%.  When 
we calculate the partial effect on SSA, however, the coefficient is only .142.  Thus, 
increased irrigation positively affects productivity in that region, but by a much 
smaller amount.  
Lastly, we find that the coefficient on corruption is negative and significant at 
the .10 level in tropical SSA.  Since higher levels of the corruption variable actually 
signify lower levels of actual corruption, the finding demonstrates a negative 
relationship between agricultural productivity and corruption in SSA. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the determinants of agricultural productivity in the 
tropics and tests whether agricultural productivity is significantly different in tropical 
sub-Saharan Africa. We find broad and consistent support for the idea that fertilizer 
usage, telephones, and rainfall have a positive effect on agricultural productivity.  
This is true both inside and outside of Africa.  We find evidence that the effect of 
irrigation, however, is different in tropical SSA.  In our baseline sample, the 
coefficient on irrigation was only significant outside of Africa.  In our alternative 
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sample, the coefficient was positive in both but the quantitative impact of irrigation 
was much reduced in SSA. 
We do not find any evidence that our institutional measures (corruption, 
government stability, and bureaucratic quality) have a statistically significant impact 
on agricultural productivity in our baseline model.  Using an alternative definition of 
tropicality, which increases the number of countries in our sample, we do find that 
government stability is positively related to agricultural productivity, and that 
corruption is particularly harmful to productivity in SSA. 
As far as policy recommendation is concerned, government policies that 
encourage more fertilizer use would seemingly help raise agricultural productivity, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Also other policies like the provision of basic 
infrastructure and basic amenities (proxied by telephone mainlines) will increase 
agricultural productivity in the tropics in general and tropical non sub-Saharan 




A possible avenue for future research would be to examine the determinants 
of agricultural productivity in those disaggregated ecological zones. This could shed 
more light on why the institutional variables are sensitive to the sample of countries 
included. 
                                                          
30
  The sharp increase in food prices since 2003 is both damaging to African economies as well as an 
opportunity for African farmers.  It is damaging in that it makes food more expensive to the average 
consumer, which may increase malnutrition levels.  If the higher food prices are positively correlated 
with government revenue (from export or income taxes), then the government has the opportunity to 
boost agricultural productivity through public investment in infrastructure, irrigation, and extension 
services.  Ackello-Ogutu (2010) argue that whether Africa can take advantage of this recent increase 
in food price will depend on how integrated Africa is with the global market and whether the price of 
imported agricultural imports (like fertilizer) falls relative to food prices.   
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Appendix 3.1: Countries and Data Availability for two different definitions of 
tropical climates 




Algeria Middle East & North 
Africa 
 1984-2005 
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa  1985-2000; 2002-2005 
Bangladesh South Asia 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Bolivia Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Brazil Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2006 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa  1985-2005 
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-2005 1984-2005 





Sub-Saharan Africa 1985-2001 1985- 2001 
Congo, D.R. Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-91; 95-96; 98-
2001 
1984-91; 95-96; 98-2001 
Costa Rica Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Cote D‟Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2005 
Ecuador Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Egypt Middle East & North 
Africa 
 1984-2005 
El Salvador Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa  1993-2005 
Gabon  Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Gambia  Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-2001; 2003-2005 1986-2001; 2003-2005 
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Guatemala Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-2005 1986-2005 
Guinea 
Bissau  
Sub-Saharan Africa 1987-2001 1987-2001 
Guyana Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Haiti Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1991-2001 1991-2001 
Honduras Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
India South Asia  1984-2005 
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Jamaica Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Kenya  Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2005 
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-1990 1984-1990 
Madagascar  Sub-Saharan Africa  1985-2005 
Malawi  Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2005 
Mali  Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2001 




Mozambique  Sub-Saharan Africa  1985-2005 
Nicaragua  Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Niger  Sub-Saharan Africa  1985-2005 
Nigeria  Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Panama Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Paraguay Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-1997 
Peru Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Philippines  East Asia & Pacific 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Senegal  Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2005 
Sierra Leone  Sub-Saharan Africa 1985-2001 1985-2001 
Sri Lanka  South Asia 1984-2004 1984-2004 
Tanzania  Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2005 1990-2005 
Thailand  East Asia & Pacific 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Togo  Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2005 
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-2005 1984-2005 
Uruguay  Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 1984-2005 
Venezuela Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1984-2005 1984-2005 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa  1984-2001; 2005 















Appendix 3.2: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Agricultural 
Production 
Aggregate volume of 
agricultural 
production relative to 
the base period 1999-
2001, net of seeds 






tons) per hectare of 
arable land  
Amount of fertilizer 
used per unit of 
arable land  




Fixed line and mobile 
phone subscribers 
(per 1,000 people) 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
Irrigation Total irrigated land as 
a % of total cropland 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
Annual Average 
Rainfall 
Average rainfall with 





Tractors Used Number of tractors 
per 100 hectares of 
arable land 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
Agricultural Land Hectares of arable 




Government Stability The subcomponents 
of this index are 
government unity, 
legislative strength, 
and popular support. 
Ranges from 0 to 12, 
with higher numbers 
representing more 
stability.  
International Country Risk Guide 
Corruption A measure of 




job reservations etc. 
The composite score 
ranges from 0 (high 
corruption) to 6 (low 
corruption) 
International Country Risk Guide 






























bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise 
to govern without 




especially when there 
is a change in 
government. It ranges 
from 0 to 4, with 
higher numbers 
representing higher 
bureaucratic quality.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Sample of Countries using the Koeppen-
Geiger (KG) Classification 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Log(Agriculture Production 
per permanent and Arable 
land) 
6.36 0.551 5.28 8.03 
Log(Fertilizer Consumption) -4.05 2.16 -10.55 -0.05 
Log(number of Telephone 
subscribers) 
2.56 1.54 -0.91 5.79 
Log(Proportion of Cropland 
Irrigated) 
1.29 1.74 -2.27 3.90 
Log(Annual Rainfall) 7.43 0.35 6.22 8.17 
Log(Number of Tractors Used) 2.90 1.82 -0.51 5.81 
Corruption Index 2.45 1.14 0 5 
Government Stability Index 6.25 2.35 1 11.08 
Bureaucratic Quality 1.56 1.09 0 3.5 





Table 3:2: Summary Statistics for the Sample using Masters’ Classification of 
Tropical Countries 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Log(Agriculture Production 
per permanent and Arable 
land) 
6.19 0.685 4.14 8.26 
Log(Fertilizer Consumption) -4.12 1.90 -10.55 -0.05 
Log(number of Telephone 
subscribers) 
2.49 1.42 -0.91 5.99 
Log(Proportion of Cropland 
Irrigated) 
1.35 1.59 -2.35 4.61 
Log(Annual Rainfall) 7.10 0.65 3.35 8.18 
Log(Number of Tractors Used) 2.86 1.80 -2.39 5.81 
Corruption Index 2.64 1.05 0 5 
Government Stability Index 6.41 2.27 1 11.58 





Table 3.3: The Determinants of Agricultural Productivity in tropical Countries  
 
 Estimation Period  
1984-2005 
Estimation Period 1984 - 2000 
 1 2 3 


















Log (Rainfall)   0.110* 
(1.80) 
























    
R-Square (Within) 0.45 0.35 0.42 
# of Observations 522 405 405 
# of Countries 27 26 26 
    
The values in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 












Table 3.4: The Determinants of Tropical Agricultural Productivity inside and 
Outside of SSA 
 Estimation Period  
1984-2005 
Estimation Period 1984 - 2000 
 1 2 3 


















Log (Rainfall)   0.044 
(1.03) 


































































    
    
R-Square (Within) 0.49 0.38 0.49 
# of Observations 522 405 405 
# of Countries 27 26 26 
The values in parentheses are (robust) t-statistics.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 




Table 3.5: The determinants of agricultural productivity in tropical countries 
using an alternative definition of climate  
                                        Estimation Period  
1984-2005 
Estimation Period 1984 - 2000 
 1 2 3 




















Log (Rainfall)   0.089** 
(2.51) 
























    
R-Square (Within) 0.45 0.35 0.42 
# of Observations 1062 829 829 
# of Countries 53 52 52 
The values in parentheses are (robust) t-statistics.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 












Table 3.6: The Determinants of Tropical Agricultural Productivity Inside and 
Outside of SSA, using an Alternative Definition of tropicality 
 Estimation Period  
1984-2005 
Estimation Period 1984 - 2000 
 1 2 3 


















Log (Rainfall)   0.020 
(0.62) 



































































R-Square (Within) 0.51 0.40 0.49 
# of Observations 1062 829 829 
# of Countries 53 52 52 
The values in parentheses are (robust) t-statistics.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 





The New Agricultural Green Revolution in Africa: The Pivotal Role African 
Leaders need to play 
4.1 Introduction  
The Green Revolution that transformed much of Asia and Latin America has 
not materialized fully in Africa despite the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
main architect of the Asian Green Revolution. There have been many reasons 
discussed in the literature as to why Africa has not been able to take advantage of the 
Green Revolution.
31
 The Asian Green Revolution was technology driven package of 
modern improved seeds, fertilizer and irrigation. Also, much of Asia has one main 
farming system, irrigation farming, and also some level of infrastructural base. For 
instance, most Asian countries on average were spending about 15% of their national 
budget on agriculture by 1972 (Hazell, 2009).  
Unlike in most part of Asia, agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa is 
characterized by small-scale farming, with diverse cropping systems which are 
primarily rainfed and make little use of inorganic fertilizer (World Bank, 2007, and 
the Rockefeller Foundation, 2006)
32
. It is therefore not surprising that when the 
engineers of the Asian Green Revolution, the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), tried using in Africa the same one-size-fits-all 
agricultural transformation method used in Asia, it did not work. In fact, the Asian 
Green revolution did not work in all countries in that region either, especially those 
                                                          
31
 Some of the previous discussions that took place in bringing Green Revolution to Africa are the 
Lagos Action program in the 1980s, the African Alternative in 1989 and recently the New Partnership 
for African Development (NEPAD) in 2002(World Bank, 2007). 
32
 Though there are export crops that are cultivated under mechanized farming system, export crops 
account for only 8 percent of total agricultural production (Peacock, Ward, and Gambarelli, 2007). 
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South and East Asian countries generally classified as “less favored” (Pender, 2008). 
For instance, in the upland regions of the Philippines, central and Eastern China, and 
some parts of India where erosion is severe, the Green Revolution did not fare well 
there (Pender, 2008). Also, the commitment of Africa leaders in using agriculture as 
an engine of growth has been shaky and changing over the years since independence. 
The collaboration between the CGIAR and NARCs of the African countries has not 
been the same as it was with the Asian counterparts.  
In this chapter, I examine the two main approaches (the focused, and 
comprehensive) suggested in the literature to help Africa transform its agricultural 
productivity. The proponents of the comprehensive approach note the complex 
nature of Africa‟s agricultural problems and hence propose that the solution should 
be multifaced and coordinated. Those who advocate for the focused approach argue 
that with scarce budgets, the solution to Africa‟s agricultural problems should be 
concise and focused on the more binding constraints to agricultural productivity. 
I will also look at  the prospect of the South-South cooperation instead of the 
typical North (Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research - CGIAR) - 
South cooperation, in part because southern countries often have similar climates and 
may have faced similar agricultural challenges (e.g. bad soil, drought like in Brazil‟s 
Cerrado), and therefore may be able to help more effectively.
33
 It should be noted 
                                                          
33
 The 15 international agricultural research centers are: International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT), International 
Potato Center (CIP), Biodiversity International, International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI), Africa Rice Center (WARDA), International Crop Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), International 
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that South-South cooperation can be either Comprehensive or focused. I argue that 
no matter the approach African countries adopt, the key to agricultural 
transformation requires a strong commitment from African leaders, with respect to 
the provision of needed infrastructure, improved institutions, and ensuring an 
enabling environment, and a coordinated effort by all partners (i.e. International 
Agricultural Research systems (IARs), National Agricultural Research Centers 
(NARCs), Sub-regional Research Organizations (SROs), both bilateral and 
multilateral development partners and philanthropists. Africa‟s agriculture will still 
be underdeveloped if cooperation yields promising improved varieties and there are 
no efficient extension services to make the farmers aware of the new varieties and 
how to plant them or if other inputs like fertilizer are not affordable because of 
poorly functioning markets for inputs and outputs. There is only so much the 
development partners will be able to do.  
The chapter is set up as follows; the next section discusses the evolution of 
agriculture research in African research over the years and the activities of the World 
Bank with respect to African agriculture. Section 4.3 examines why the earlier Green 
Revolution did not succeed in Africa. Section 4.4 discusses the pros and cons of 
going with a focused versus a comprehensive approach to transforming agriculture 
productivity in Africa and section 4.5 analyses the prospects of South-South 
cooperation being the panacea to Africa‟s agricultural problems. Section 4.6 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Water  Management Institute (IWMI), International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), WorldFish 
Center, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), and World Agroforestry Center. 
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discusses the role Africa leaders need to play in transforming Africa‟s agriculture. 
The last section concludes. 
4.2 The Evolution of Agricultural Research in Africa 
Agricultural research systems in Africa has evolved from the colonial days 
where most of the research was undertaken in regional research centers to the current 
research system involving national, regional and international research centers with 
active roles played by philanthropical organizations, financial institutions, bilateral 
and multilateral donors.
34
 Colonial leaders recognized both the potential of their 
colonies as suppliers of raw materials, as well as the diversified nature of agro-
ecological conditions in Africa. They therefore opted for regional research centers 
strategically located in countries like Cote D‟Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, they focused on developing technologies for a small number of export 
crops, and would hopefully spill over to neighboring countries (ECA, 2003). For 
instance, in 1921, the French established a research station in Bambey (Senegal) to 
undertake research on groundnuts. The mandate of this research station was 
expanded in 1938 to become the Federal Station for Agronomic Research in 
Francophone West Africa. The British also established a research station in 
Zimbabwe in 1909 and a cotton research center in Sudan in 1919. These regional 
research organizations were linked with global commodity networks, also 
                                                          
34
 For more detailed analysis of how agricultural research has changed over the years, the reader may 
refer to Beintema, and Stads (2006), Greenland (1997), Roseboom, Pardey, and Beintema (1998) and 
Chema, Gilbert, and Roseboom (2003). 
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established by the colonial leaders for the exchange of germplasm (Cooper, 1970).
35
 
The agricultural research under colonial rule was also fashioned out under the 
umbrella of 2-3 year development plans (ECA, 2003).  
After World War II, the colonial leaders restructured agriculture research in 
Africa. The British Colonial Headquarters for regional research in East Africa was 
renamed the East African Agriculture and Forestry Research Organization 
(EAAFRO) and moved to Muguga (outside Nairobi) from Amani, to serve Kenya, 
Tanganyika, and Uganda. Its mandate was also broadened to cover research on both 
agriculture and forestry. Some of the achievements of the earlier regional research 
organizations, before World War II, include the development of hybrid maize in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, rust-resistant wheat in Kenya, hybrid oil palms in Zaire and 
cotton in Uganda, Sudan, and Francophone West Africa.  
After most African countries gained their independence in the late 1950s and 
1960s, the regional research centers established by the colonial authorities were 
typically merged into the National Agricultural Research centers (NARCs) or closed. 
For instance, three years after Nigeria‟s independence in 1963, West Africa Institute 
for Oil Palm Research (WAIFOR), based in Nigeria, which had helped Nigeria to 
become the largest exporter of oil palm at the time of its independence, was 
nationalized. After WAIFOR was nationalized, it was renamed the Nigeria Institute 
for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR). The number of staff of NIFOR was also increased 
                                                          
35
 Germplasm is genetic material used to breed crops/plants that are more productive (e.g. through 
being more responsive to other inputs such as fertilizer, and having short maturity period) and 
resistance to constraints like pest and diseases.  
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from 15 to 283 within a span of five years (Eicher, 1989). Likewise, the West Africa 
cocoa research in Ghana was nationalized and renamed the Cocoa Research Institute 
of Ghana. One major problem almost all African countries faced with respect to 
agricultural research was that, with the exception of Nigeria and Kenya, most 
countries did not have the qualified staff to effectively run their agricultural 
extension services. Fortunately, the world market price for cash crops like cocoa, 
coffee, and tea were favorable in the 1960s and 1970s. Most revenue derived from 
the exports of these cash crops were used to train manpower, with the main 
agricultural strategies articulated in national development plans (ECA, 2003). In the 
1970s, most African countries, using national food policy plans, tried to increase the 
production of foodstuff to ensure food sufficiency, with varying degrees of success. 
For instance, Tanzania, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Ghana all adopted a national 
food sufficiency policy in the 1970s.
36
 
While these regional research centers were being “Africanized”, the national 
agricultural research centers (NARCs) were being expanded in terms of the number 
of staff, commodities, and research projects, with readily available donor funding 
from institutions like USAID. Another phenomenon that took place in the wake of 
this unprecedented expansion is the disproportionate distribution of agricultural 
scientists across African countries. For instance, while about 80 percent of 
agricultural scientists were located in 13 countries, the remaining 20 percent of the 
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 Nigeria had operation Feed the Nation as a pilot project in 1976, and later adopted Accelerated 
Food Production Program in 1978. Ghana also adopted operation Feed Yourself in 1973. While 
Nigeria achieved surpluses in some crops, Ghana only achieved an annual agricultural growth rate of 
2.6% against a targeted growth rate of 6% (Girdner et al., 1980; Lawani and Babaleye, 1992). 
79 
 
scientists were located in the remaining 35 countries (CGIAR, 2003). This skewed 
distribution of scientists likely results in some areas (countries) being neglected since 
there are not many regional research centers to rely on. 
The problems in the expansion of the NARCs between 1960 and 1980 
resulted in the rebirth of regional research in the 1980s as a way of addressing this 
disproportional distribution of expertise. A group of western donors established the 
Special Program for African Agricultural Research (SPAAR) in 1985. The SPAAR 
was mandated to coordinate donor aid to agricultural research in Africa and to 
strengthen the capacity of NARCs to utilize new technology from the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system (SPAAR, 1997). In 
the 1990s, the SPAAR, launched an initiative to promote regional research by noting 
that it has considerable potential to strengthen the NARCs (SPAAR, 1995:42). 
SPAAR played a key role in establishing three sub-regional Research Organizations 
(SROs) in the 1980s and 1990s. The West and Central African Council for 
Agricultural Research and Development (CORAF/WECARD), founded in 1987, has 
22 member countries located across three agroecological zones.
37
 The Southern 
African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural and Natural Resources Research and 
Training (SACCAR) was the most active and well-organized SRO during the early 
1990s, but most of its activities were discontinued in recent years due to a major 
reorganization of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), its parent 
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 The member countries for CORAF/WECARD are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote D‟Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, The 






  The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) 
Directorate was launched in December 2001, as part of a SADC restructuring 
exercise. The last SRO that SPAAR helped in establishing is the Association for 
Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA), the 
most influential SRO currently, which was established in 1993, with 10 members, 
with the goal of promoting regional cooperation in agricultural research in Eastern 
and Central Africa.
39
   
While these SROs were being rebuilt and the NARCs were being 
restructured, the CGIAR, with its 15 International Agricultural Research System 
(IARS), was also making inroads and laying the foundation for the launching of a 
new Green Revolution for Africa. After the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) was established in 1962 in the Philippines by the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) was 
established in 1967 in Nigeria to improve the yield and quality of tropical food crops 
other than rice. The IITA was perhaps overambitious in the number of crops it 
conducted research on in the initial stages. In particular by 1974, IITA researchers 
were researching over 10 crops, including cassava, sweet potatoes, cocoyam, maize, 
and rice. On the other hand, the IRRI and the International Center for the 
Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) only concentrated on wheat and 
maize, sorghum and millet respectively. Despite IITA being overambitious with the 
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 The founding member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
39
 The members of ASARECA are Burundi, D.R. Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
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initial large number of crops it conducted research on, it chalked up early success in 
releasing high yielding cassava varieties in 1976, which increased yield by about 
40% without fertilizer (Nweke, Spencer, and Lynam, 2002). The IITA has also made 
important contributions in developing soybean, cowpeas, and maize variety, which is 
resistant to streak virus and downy mildew.  
The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) was established in 1972 by CGIAR and given the mandate to conduct 
research in 5 crops: sorghum, pear millet, groundnuts, pigeonpeas, and chick peas 
(legumes). The West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), now called 
Africa Rice Association, was also established in Monrovia as an autonomous 
intergovernmental research association of 11 countries in West Africa. WARDA 
joined the CGIAR in 1974. The major achievement of WARDA is the development 
of NERICA which is a rice crossbreed that has the robustness of African rice and the 
high yielding properties of Asian rice. Though there have been some technological 
improvements in agricultural production in Africa, especially in the area of the 
development and release of improved seeds like sorghum, rice, wheat, and maize, the 
increase in productivity has been modest and has generally not been able to keep 
pace with population growth (Nweke et al., 2002). For instance, even though Sub-
Saharan Africa has seen a steady increase in the adoption of improved cereal 
varieties, only 22 percent of its land area was devoted to improved cereal variety 
cultivation in 2000 (World Bank, 2008). While most of the increase in agricultural 
production in sub-Saharan African has been due to increased land area cultivated, 
with crop yield stagnating, that of Asia and Latin America has been due to crop yield 
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(World Bank, 2007 and Toenniessen et al., 2008). Also the modest agricultural 
productivity experienced in Africa has been varying and dramatic across countries. 
For instance, while a country like Gabon moved from poor performance in 1990–
2000 to better performance in 2000–04, Malawi moved in the opposite direction. 
Only about 25% of African countries, among them Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Ghana, exhibited consistently better performance between 
1990 and 2000 (World Bank, 2007). Chapter 1 of this thesis shows how important 
fertilizer usage, infrastructure, and rainfall are to agricultural productivity in sub-
Saharan Africa. With low levels of physical infrastructure, low fertilizer usage, and 
erratic rainfall levels, it is not surprising to see lower agricultural productivity in 
Africa. 
It is clear that the focus of agricultural research has moved from relying on 
more regional research organizations to national one and then later to collaboration 
between regional, national and international research organizations. This evolution 
has been dictated by the role agriculture is perceived to play by various policymakers 
at different point in time. During the colonial era, agriculture was seen mostly as a 
source of raw materials for industries in the West. Immediately after independence, 
agriculture was considered, by African leaders, as a source of foreign exchange and 
hence the emphasis being on the production of cash crops like cocoa, coffee and 
rubber. It was only in the 1980s that efforts were made to make agriculture the 
engine of growth and the main source of poverty reduction in Africa, perhaps 
because of the earlier success of the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America. 
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This resulted in collaboration between international agricultural research institutions 
and some national agricultural research centers in Africa. 
The World Bank has not had a formal strategy for the agricultural sector in 
Africa, but rather the Bank‟s goal for agricultural development is articulated under 
the broader rural development strategies. The importance given to agriculture under 
the rural development strategy has been changing over the years. In the 1970s, 
agriculture development was very prominent but become less so in later years. This 
change in prominence of agricultural development is because in the 1970s, the 
Bank‟s activities in the rural areas were mainly in the agricultural sector. But in the 
1980s and 1990s, the Bank‟s role expanded into human development, and 
sustainable development respectively. The Bank‟s rural development strategy 
continued to become broader in subsequent years and agriculture became a smaller 
percentage of the total rural portfolio (World Bank, 2007).   
The World Bank‟s lending to agricultural sector in Africa increased through 
the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, while Bank‟s lending to the agricultural sector in 
Eastern African countries increased from 1964-1968 annual average of $5.3 million 
to an annual lending of $124.2 million in 1975, that of Western African countries 
increased from $3.6 million to $323 million within the same period (World Bank, 
1975). Some of the notable projects undertaken by the Bank in Africa within this 
period are lending to boost exports of cocoa in Cameroon and Ivory Coast, 
cocoa/coffee project in Togo, a rubber project in Cameroun and pineapple project in 
Guinea in 1974.  
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The Bank supported about 262 projects in Africa with agricultural 
components between 1991 and 2006, valued at $14.31 billion, out of which only $4.5 
billion was devoted solely to agricultural projects (World Bank, 2007). Further 
examination of the Bank‟s lending to Africa‟s agriculture shows that investment 
lending was even smaller. For instance, out of $ 4.5 billion dollars devoted to pure 
agricultural lending projects, $2.8 billion was investment lending while the 
remaining $1.72 billion was structural adjustment or development policy lending 
(World Bank, 2007). These figures illustrate how agriculture has become less 
prominent in the Bank‟s general rural development strategy in the 1990s, since the 
$2.8 billion investment lending for Africa‟s agriculture constitutes only 8 percent of 
the Bank‟s total investment lending to the region. The percentage of the Bank‟s 
lending for agricultural projects for Africa has increased considerably since the late 
1990s. For instance, while investment lending for agriculture in Africa decreased 
from $419 million in 1991 to $123 million in 2000, it increased to $685 million in 
2006 (World Bank, 2007 p. 26).  
A review by the World Bank‟s activities in Africa with respect to agricultural 
productivity by the Bank‟s  Internal Evaluation Group (2007) concluded that the 
Bank has had limited success in addressing the constraints confronting Africa‟s 
agricultural productivity. Some of the reasons cited are that the analytical work 
which is supposed to diagnose the constraints has been limited, not readily available, 




In sum, while various interventions have taken place in African agriculture, 
the results have been subpar. The CGIAR attempted to implement Africa‟s version 
of Green Revolution but it also fell short of expected results. I discuss various 
reasons for this lack of success.  
4.3 Why the Original Green Revolution Stalled in Africa 
The general consensus is that the earlier Green Revolution started in the mid 
1960s and continued into the 1990s. But the idea of Green Revolution was nursed in 
1941 with a casual conversation between the then Vice-President of the United 
States, Henry Wallace, and the Rockefeller president then, Raymond B. Fosdick. The 
conversation was about the US Vice-President, telling the Rockefeller foundation 
president to increase the yield of beans and corn in Mexico and that will be the 
greatest thing happening to that country. That conversation resulted in a research 
center being established outside Mexico City.  The success achieved in Mexico 
convinced the Rockefeller Foundation to start a similar country program in India in 
1957, and three years later the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation created the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Banos, Philippines. The breeding 
and adoption of modern high yielding varieties of crops spread from Mexico to 
Colombia, India, and Philippines and farther into other parts of Asia and Latin 
America (Rockefeller Foundation, 2006). It should be noted that though the first 
generation high yielding modern varieties (MVs) were released in the mid 1960s, the 
second and third generation MVs were also released in the 1970s. The first 
generation MVs, which was originally developed by IARC (e.g. rice developed by 
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IRRI, and wheat and maize developed by CIMMYT) are high yielding varieties that 
responded well to the use of inorganic fertilizer, but susceptible to pest and diseases. 
The second generation MVs were both high yielding and resistant to pests and 
diseases. While both the first and second generation MVs were bred for cross 
country adoption, the third generation MVs were more ecological specific (Otsuka 
and Kalirajan, 2005). 
The success of this earlier Green Revolution did not reach all part of Asia and 
Africa. In particular the less favored areas of South and East Asia did not reap the 
full benefit of this earlier Green revolution (Pender, 2008).
40
 This has prompted the 
proposition of a different agricultural technology approach for these less favored 
regions in Asia. This new proposed technology approaches include low external 
input and sustainable agriculture, organic agriculture and biotechnology (Pender, 
2008).  
The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations which spearheaded the earlier Green 
Revolution in Asia and Latin America attempted to implemented similar policies in 
Africa, but like less favored areas in Asia, Africa did not achieve the same success as 
in earlier Green Revolution. The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
(IITA) was opened in 1967 in Ibadan, Nigeria, After 7 years of its establishment, the 
IITA was carrying out research on cassava, yam, sweet potato, cocoyams, maize, 
rice, cowpea, soybean, lima bean, pigeonpea, winged bean, African yam bean and 
velvet bean (IITA, 1992). The IITA released a high yielding cassava variety in the 
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 The less favored region of East and South Asia is defined as those areas located in uplands and 
mountains, marginal coastal areas and drylands. The main agricultural practices in these areas rely on 
rainfall, with poor market and infrastructure. 
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1970s and 1980s which was widely adopted in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, which 
was even productive without fertilizer. In 1979, IITA, CIAT and other national and 
international organizations cooperated to find a solution for cassava mealybug, 
resulting in a release of the wasp, the predator of the mealybug, in 1990. The IITA 
also contributed to the development of soybean, cowpeas, and steak virus and downy 
mildew resistance in maize, the adoption of which was hampered by unavailability of 
fertilizer, at least in Nigeria.  
The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) was established in 1972 in India with its West African program launched 
in mid-1975 by posting scientists to Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, Niger and Mali. 
The ICRISAT had little success in importing improved sorghum varieties from India. 
It is clear that ICRISAT realized that one cannot just import an improved variety and 
expect it to work in an agro-diversified African environment. 
The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), now 
AfricaRice, was established in 1971, and became a member of CGIAR in 1974. The 
WARDA also did not do well with the importation of rice variety from IRRI initially 
until it launched Special Research Projects in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal, 
and Cote D‟Ivoire with the aim of developing a rice variety that will perform well 
under West African conditions. The main success of WARDA is the introduction of 
the New Rice for Africa (NERICA). 
The International Livestock Center in Africa (ILCA) was established in 1974 
in Ethiopia. The ICLA also had little success because of the complexities of African 
agriculture. The CIMMYT also has some partnership with other national research 
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centers in developing national wheat and maize varieties. It can be seen that the 
earlier international research centers in Africa did not achieve the same success as in 
Asia and Latin America.   
The reasons for Africa‟s inability to take advantage of the earlier Green 
Revolution can be traced in part to the difficulty of the IARs to develop an adaptable 
improved variety for Africa. Compounding the problem was the lack of physical 
infrastructure and the institutional framework to enable the smooth transfer and 
adoption of the improved technologies introduced by the IARs in working with the 
various National Agricultural Research Centers (NARCs). The early success in the 
breeding of rice and wheat varieties was due to access to rich stocks of genetic 
resources already developed by advanced countries (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). For 
other crops like tropical cassava and beans, however, there was no prior work on 
them done by the developed countries to rely on and the lack of research of elite 
germplasm in the 1960s (Dalrymple, 1986 and Johnson et al., 2003). The 
development of modern varieties for these crops therefore took longer. 
Thus researchers on African crops had to start from scratch unlike in Asia 
and Latin America, where there were abundant body of knowledge on modern 
varieties of the two main crops, rice and wheat to rely on. Also, unlike in Asia and 
Latin America, where researchers only had to breed two main crops, rice and wheat, 
which are predominantly cultivated by most of the farmers, in Africa, crop breeders 
had to breed many crops which face different agroecological constraints. 
There were also impediments to the growth yield of the developed modern 
varieties in Africa. The complementary inputs that were needed to make farmers 
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realize the full potential of the MVs were either unavailable or unaffordable. Africa 
as a region uses less fertilizer than Asia and Latin America on average. For instance, 
in 1995 to 2005, while the average intensity of fertilizer use throughout Africa was 
roughly 9 kilograms per hectare, it was 86 and 104 kilograms in Latin America and 
South Asia, respectively (World Bank, 2007). The reasons cited for this lack of 
fertilizer usage is the high cost of fertilizer. It is estimated that free on board (f.o.b.) 
prices and landing costs make fertilizer twice as expensive on average in Africa as it 
is in Asia (Shepherd and Coster, 1987). This high cost of fertilizer in Africa is due to 
the small volumes of fertilizer bought by many African countries, which reduces 
their bargaining power, as well as the high transportation costs caused by bad roads 
(Vlek, 1990).  
Another important input/infrastructure that was readily available in the earlier 
Green Revolution but was lacking in Africa is irrigation. While rice and wheat were 
grown on irrigated farms in Asia, Africa‟s farming system mostly depended on 
rainfall, which is very erratic, with little control of the amount of water available. 
The proportion of arable and permanent crop land irrigated in 2002 was only 4% in 
Africa but 39% in South Asia (World Bank, 2008). The unavailability of irrigation 
and fertilizer also reduced the adoption of modern varieties because the high risk of 
crop loss or not realizing the full yield of the Modern Varieties. Thus the three main 
factors that propelled the earlier Green Revolution in Asia and Latin, modern 
varieties, irrigation, and fertilizer were not available in Africa in sufficient quantities. 
In Asia, the main genetic factors hindering crop productivity before the Green 
Revolution was that the local crops did not respond to inorganic fertilizer. The first 
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generation Modern Varieties (MV1) released was a high yielding variety which 
responded very well to the application of inorganic fertilizer.  Africa on the other, 
rainfed agriculture with little use of either organic or inorganic fertilizer, has to 
develop a crop variety that will be able to withstand droughts, insufficient soil 
nutrients, pests, and diseases (Toenniessen et al., 2008). 
Government commitment has also been lacking in Africa, with respect to 
devoting the necessary resources for the development of the agricultural sector. As 
already indicated, though there had been some discussions of bringing the Green 
Revolution to Africa, there have not been much concrete steps taken by African 
leaders to make this happen (World Bank, 2007). An effective government is needed 
to provide the necessary infrastructure like roads, and an enabling environment for 
the development of market for both inputs and outputs. Toenniessen et al. (2008), 
found a positive correlation between the rate of technology agricultural technology 
adoption and the state of market institutional development. The provision of this 
infrastructure will go a long way in reducing the price of fertilizers, and also entice 
farmers to adopt the MVs since there will be likely market where there can sell their 
harvest as a result of growing the MVs. Also national governments will be required 
to institute educational reforms to train manpower to form efficient local crop 
breeders and extension officers for the development and dissemination of local MVs. 
This is very important because local crop breeders are more familiar with local crop 
constraints like diseases and pests, and thus will be in a better position to help 
develop an MV which will be resistant to those local constraints. Even if the IARs 
take a leading role in the breeding of the crops, local inputs will be needed and 
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government could play a major role in developing that local manpower. Rosegrant 
and Hazell (2001) argue that the Green Revolution worked so well in India at least in 
part due to the important increase in public investment before and during the period 
in question.  Much of this investment was in road construction, electrification, and 
irrigation, underscoring the important role played by national government.  
It will also be helpful if African leaders can provide the necessary 
environment to ensure the functioning of a sound financial market to enable farmers 
access credit to buy the needed improved seeds and complementary inputs like 
inorganic fertilizer. Additionally maintaining law and order and reducing corruption 
should be undertaken by African leaders. Reducing corruption is very important so 
that farmers are not exploited in terms of getting the seeds from various mandated 
government agencies.  
Another problem faced by African agriculture is the sometimes 
uncoordinated effort by various development partners. An Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG) study commissioned by the World Bank in 2007 to assess its funding 
for the development of African agriculture found, among other things, that though 
the Bank has funded many aspect of agricultural activities like research, extension, 
credit, seeds, and policy reforms, the Bank has failed to recognize the potential 
synergy among them to effectively contribute to agricultural development. The 
report also found that though there has been some comparative success in some 
areas, like research, progress in other areas have stalled as a result of a weak linkages 
with extension and limited availability of such complementary and critical inputs as 
fertilizers and water. The report further indicates that of the top ten borrowers 
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(including Cote D‟Ivoire, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda), none had received a 
consistent and simultaneous support across all critical subsectors of agricultural 
production.  
There have been policy strategies, proposed by African leaders, development 
partners, and philanthropy organizations, aimed at addressing some of the various 
problems of African agricultural productivity discussed above. In 2003, African 
leaders endorsed the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program 
(CAADP) under the auspices of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development 
(NEPAD). The CAADP is a policy framework which encourages African leaders to 
make conscious efforts at restoring agricultural growth, food and nutritional security, 
and rural development. The CAADP has four pillars under which various strategies 
are articulated in achieving the stated goal of agricultural productivity, food security 
and rural development. The pillar IV of the CAADP discusses what needs to be 
done, among other things including devoting at least 10% of national budgets to 
agriculture, to increase productivity. The agricultural productivity of sub-Saharan 
Africa is also expected to reach 6% per annum by 2015, if most African countries are 
to meet their Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty level by 2015.The 
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) was set up in 2002, to bring 
together and coordinate efforts of all stakeholders in agricultural research and 
development in Africa, thus essentially replacing the Special Program for African 
Agricultural Research (SPAAR). Since the inception of FARA, it has organized 
various conferences and training programs for staff from various national 
agricultural research organizations and regional agricultural research organizations.   
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In 2006, there was also an African Fertilizer Summit, organized in Abuja, 
Nigeria and sponsored by development partners like the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. The summit, which was attended by most of the African 
leaders sought to inform the leaders how important affordable fertilizer would be to 
the smooth rollout of Africa‟s Green Revolution. In the end African leaders agreed to 
remove tariffs on fertilizer. It is believed that this will go a long way in reducing the 
price of fertilizer and encouraging its use by farmers, which ultimately will lead to 
agricultural productivity.  
The Rockefeller Foundation and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundations 
established the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa in 2007 and the United 
Kingdom‟s Department for International Development (DFID) became a funding 
partner in 2008. The strategy for Africa‟s Green Revolution share some basic 
principles of the earlier Green Revolution, like improved seed variety, with an 
integrated soil management which encompasses the use of both organic and 
inorganic fertilizer, alternative farming system that disturb the soil less, like no 
tillage, mulching, water harvesting, and growth of cover crops like legumes. It also 
has a semblance of both the comprehensive approach and  the focused approach, in 
that while it targets all the various aspect of agricultural productivity, like developing 
improved variety, developing local man power, developing market for agricultural 
inputs and outputs, lobbying government to provide the enabling environment, it also 
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focuses first on a few countries it deems the “breadbasket”. 
41
Since its establishment 
in 2007, AGRA has launched programs ranging from human capital development to 
soil management. For instance in 2010, AGRA launched a PhD program in soil 
science for West Africa at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
(KNUST) located in Kumasi, Ghana.
42
 In 2009, AGRA launched the Program for 
Integrated Soil Management in Maputo, Mozambique, with the aim of increasing 
production among farmers in the Nampula and Zambezia provinces.
43
  
There has been general understanding among African leaders as to what 
needs to be done in order for Africa to increase its agricultural productivity. Some 
inroads have been made, with respect to African leaders committed to provide the 
necessary public investment in agriculture and reducing tariff on fertilizer. More 
work is still needed to be done for Africa‟s experience any appreciable growth in its 
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 The “breadbasket” refers to four countries, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania, that are 
deemed to have large concentration of smallholder farmers, have relatively good soils and basic 
infrastructure are already in place. 
42
 Accessed on 09/27/2011: http://www.agra-alliance.org/content/news/detail/1250. 
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 Accessed on 09/27/2011: http://www.agra-alliance.org/content/news/detail/1043. 
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4.4 Approaches to Transform Africa’s Agricultural Productivity 
As mentioned above, there are two main approaches that have been proposed 
that Africa can adopt to increase its agricultural productivity: the Comprehensive 
approach, and the focused approach. The comprehensive approach, argues that 
Africa and development partners should take a broader approach in developing 
agricultural productivity. It is believed that Africa can make meaningful headway in 
increasing agricultural productivity only when African leaders develop sufficient 
manpower for agricultural research, breed different crop varieties that do well in 
different agroecological zones, improve extension services, engage in integrated soil 
management, provide physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, irrigation, goods and 
financial market), and strengthen institutions (e.g. efficient seed and output markets, 
and policies to address land tenure problems). The proponents of the focused 
approach argue that since Africa may not have the resources to engage in the 
comprehensive approach to develop its agricultural sector, it should instead focus on 
a few crops, like rice, that it has the potential of growing on a large scale. For the 
proponents of this second strategy, when African countries are successful in doing 
this, their central governments will have the incentive to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and improved institutions.  
The new Green Revolution for Africa launched by the Rockefeller and Bill 
and Millender Gate Foundations has characteristics of both the comprehensive and 
focused approaches. This is because the new Green Revolution for Africa embodies 
both the comprehensive and focused approaches. 
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The Millennium Village Project (MVP) which was launched in 2005/6 with 
the aim of helping rural African communities to achieve the Millennium 
development goals, among them halving the poverty level by 2015, also has features 
of both comprehensive and focused approach. The MVP has five priority areas - 
agriculture, health, education, infrastructure, and business development- which are 
executed simultaneously and hence being comprehensive in that sense. However the 
MVP only was launched in a dozen of villages with the possibility of being scaled up 
and so being focused. While there have been some level of consensus on the growth 
in agricultural productivity (though the rate of the increase in agricultural 
productivity has been varying from study to study), the income levels of the 
participating villages have not increased that much (see e.g. Wanjala and Muradian, 
2011). 
4.4.1 Comprehensive Approach 
The first strategy that has been proposed by many agricultural researchers 
(e.g. the proponents of AGRA; ECA, 2003; Sachs, 2005; and World Bank, 2008) as 
to the way agricultural productivity can be transformed in Africa is what I term the 
“Comprehensive Approach”.  The proponents of this approach argue that any 
strategy to transform Africa‟s agricultural productivity should be multifaceted, and 
should include the breeding of several crops, a well trained extension service staff, 
integrated soil management, good institutions (e.g. land reforms, corruption free), 
and the necessary physical and financial infrastructure. Toenniessen et al. (2008) 
proposed a “rainbow” Green Revolution which encompasses productivity growth for 
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many different crops, with an emphasis on farmer participation, local adaptation, a 
strengthening national and local institutions, and the building of agricultural value 
chains (especially with involvement of agribusiness) that enables farmers to generate 
profits from surplus production.  
It is argued that the only way Africa can increase its productivity is the 
breeding of modern varieties of crops that are not only high yielding but also 
resistant to various crop diseases and pests. But unlike in the earlier Green revolution 
where mostly two crops, Rice and Wheat and to a lesser extent, corn, were the main 
crops, in Africa, because of the different agroecological zones, more crops will be 
needed since one or two crops may not do well in different agroecological zones. For 
instance, Gordon Conway‟s “Doubly Green Revolution” (1997) calls for the 
breeding of improved varieties, with less use of inorganic fertilizer to avoid the 
environmental problems caused by the earlier Green Revolution in Asia and Latin 
America. There should also be a well trained extension service staff to inform the 
farmers about the new improved varieties and how to plant them. This is very 
important because to get the most out the improved variety, most of the improved 
varieties are given in a package (i.e. the number of seeds, the amount of fertilizer to 
apply, and the space between the plants).  
With respect to integrated soil management, both organic and inorganic 
fertilizer should be used to reduce the possible harmful effect excessive use of 
inorganic fertilizer may have on the biodiversity. Also other practices such as no-
tillage, water harvesting, growing of cover crops like legumes, and mulching should 
98 
 
be encouraged. Then there should be a well functioning market for both agricultural 
inputs and products, and good roads. Well functioning markets would allow farmers 
to get access to the various seeds on time and to sell the produce in the market, 
which also encourages farmers to adopt the improved varieties. To reduce over 
reliance on the rainfall, there should be some type of irrigation systems. The 
provision of irrigation will also go a long way to reduce the risks associated with 
crop loss as a result of varying and uncertain rainfall levels. Finally, there should be 
a well functioning financial system to enable the farmers access credit to the needed 
inputs. 
The main argument for the comprehensive approach is that all of these 
aspects of agricultural production should occur simultaneously or at least in a 
coordinated fashion because the absence of any can ruin the effort put in other 
aspects. For instance, if agronomists are able to breed the improved varieties and the 
farmers are unable to afford complementary inputs like fertilizer, due to high cost 
caused by bad roads or no market for inputs, the yield from the improved variety will 
be lower and that will adversely affect the adoption of that technology. In the same 
vein, if the soil is poor in nutrients, it will affect crop yields and the adoption of new 
technologies. Most of the cooperation between International agricultural research 
centers, national agricultural research centers, donor agencies, and philanthropists 
has generally been fashioned in a comprehensive approach. For instance, the 
Rockefeller foundation has awarded some scholarships to African students to pursue 
Masters and PhD degrees in Agricultural science in various Universities. Also 
International Agricultural research systems under CGIAR have worked closely with 
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national agricultural research centers in breeding improved crop varieties. But all the 
facets of this comprehensive approach (e.g. improved variety, soil fertility, adequate 
rainfall or irrigation, and well functioning institutions) have not been present at all 
time.  
A report by Internal Evaluation Group of the World Bank (2007) indicated 
that the Bank have not had the desired results with respect to agricultural 
development in Africa because the Banks strategies and policies have not been 
comprehensive and coordinated enough. In particular, the report noted that because 
of the complex nature of the problems faced in agricultural productivity in Africa, 
the solutions will require coordinated interventions across a range of activities both 
in the agricultural sector and other relevant related sectors like the service sector.  
The report in particular states that if improved seeds, water, infrastructure, and credit 
extension, among other measures are made available simultaneously or in optimal 
sequence, rapid growth in agricultural income is achievable in Africa (World Bank, 
2007).  
The World Bank report (World Bank, 2008) also indicated that the new 
approach to agricultural development should meet some preconditions and the 
strategies being comprehensive and environmentally sustainable. The preconditions 
are political and macroeconomic stability, without which any agricultural agenda 





4.4.2 Focused Approach 
The proponents of focused approach to transforming Africa‟s agriculture 
argue that Africa may not have the necessary resources to pursue the comprehensive 
approach and also because of the complementary nature of the various constraints to 
agricultural productivity in Africa, it is not necessary solving all the constraints 
simultaneously. They propose that, contrary to the comprehensive approach, Africa 
should concentrate on breeding a couple of crops. Also they argue that because of the 
interrelated nature of the constraints, Africa should concentrate on eliminating the 
constraints that are more binding.  
It is also argued that since the earlier Green Revolution was technology led 
and institutionally supported, Africa can use similar method, and when they are 
successful in improving yields, institutional reforms will follow as a result. For 
instance, Otsuka and Kijima (2010) note that the development of high yielding rice 
and wheat by International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and the International 
Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) subsequently induced 
public expenditure on irrigation, credit programs, national research and extension 
services because of the increased return on those investments caused by the high 
yields of the MVs. They also note that markets for both inputs and outputs 
subsequently emerged because of the profitable opportunities created by the modern 
varieties. 
Otsuka and Kijima (2010) propose that Africa should concentrate on human 
capacity building, research and irrigation. They also propose that Africa should use 
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rice as the main crop that spur in the Green revolution in Africa because the body of 
knowledge is already available.  
It is a bit difficult to assume that as soon as there is increase in crop yield, 
public investment in other complimentary areas like irrigation, markets and 
infrastructure will increase subsequently. In fact in the 1970s, the international prices 
for most of the African cash crops were favorable, but one did not see any massive 
increase investments in infrastructure. If African leaders are committed to improving 
agricultural productivity but lack resources for a comprehensive approach, then one 
will expect that an increase in crop yield may subsequent result in increase public 
spending in other areas.  
Clearly the comprehensive approach would be the ideal solution to Africa‟s 
agriculture difficulties, but due to lack of adequate resources to implement the 
comprehensive approach, African countries may have no option other than going 
with the focused approach. The proponents of the New Green Revolution for Africa 
may have anticipated the difficulty of implementing the comprehensive approach in 
all countries in Africa. Rather the new Green Revolution will be implemented in 
phases starting with countries having basic rural infrastructure, and then spreading to 
other African countries. This is in some sense having features of both the focused 





4.4.3 Case Study: The New Green Revolution for Africa 
As president of the Rockefeller Foundation for six years (1998-2004), 
Gordon Conway had the institutional and financial power of one of the world‟s 
largest philanthropic organizations behind him. The result was that the New Green 
Revolution in Africa finally got off the ground in 1999. After its official launch, the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) was established by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2006. AGRA was 
established as a public charity with the aim of using agriculture to reduce hunger and 
poverty in Africa. AGRA intends to do so by increasing the productivity and 
profitability of small-scale farmers through technological, policy and institutional 
innovations that are environmentally and economically sustainable. The Program for 
a Green Revolution in Africa (ProGRA), a supporting organization for AGRA was 
also established to implement the initiatives under the auspices of AGRA. 
The real question is whether this new Green Revolution for Africa will be 
different from the earlier one. In other words, how will this new Green revolution be 
able to increase the small scale African peasant farmers yield and income, and at the 
same time be gentle on fresh water supplies, crop diversity and soil health, that all 
suffered during earlier Green Revolution? Conway indicated that the success of this 
new revolution will depend on four sub-revolutions: 1) Agroeconomists working 
closely with farmers to identify obstacles and opportunities; 2) the use of existing 
resources; 3) integrating the African farmer into the global market and ensuring that 
the farmers receives the necessary benefit; 4) management of continuous revolution 
of science and technology (Conway, 1997). These strategies have generally been 
103 
 
adopted by AGRA in its strategies. This is quite different from the one-size-fits all 
policy adopted by the earlier researchers in modernizing African agriculture. AGRA 
envisages a new strategy that will involve “disseminating many crop varieties that 
will thrive in diverse conditions; improving soil health through integrated soil 
fertility management; and developing technologies that maximize the use of 
rainwater and deliver small-scale irrigation” (AGRA, 2008). The new strategy 
encompasses both the focused approach and the comprehensive approach in the 
sense that it will concentrate on only the 4 countries at first but the four programs are 
comprehensive in nature and will be pursued concurrently. 
AGRA‟s integrated strategy is made up of three portfolios and four programs. 
The first portfolio will concentrate on four countries – Ghana, Mali, Mozambique 
and Tanzania- with high potential “breadbasket”, in terms of large concentration of 
small-scale farmers, relatively good soil and basic infrastructure. It is believed that 
increased access to improved seeds, soil and water management has the potential to 
significantly and sustainably increase farmers‟ production of key staple food crops. 
AGRA expects to devote about 40 percent of its resources to this portfolio and 
evaluate it for a possible scale up in 2012. In portfolio two, AGRA will be preparing 
the grounds for agricultural transformations in nine additional countries. This will 
involve the strengthening of smallholder productivity, develop staple crop markets 
and improve market access. The number of countries is expected to increase to 13 in 
2013. The third and last portfolio will coordinate regional initiatives and advocacy to 
establish a supportive environment either through developing policies or raising 
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funds for rural roads and power lines. AGRA will allocate 13% of its resources to 
this portfolio. 
The four programs of AGRA-seeds, soil health, market access, and policy 
and partnerships-are integrated in all three portfolios of AGRA. In addition to these 
four programs, AGRA‟s resource mobilization strategy involves both activating the 
traditional sources of bilateral and multilateral funding and tapping into previously 
untapped resources within Africa. The seeds program will involve funding agro-
ecology based breeding by national and local research programs, coordination with 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system to 
disseminate existing improved seed varieties through supporting the development of 
seed retailers, and partnering with African Universities to train more African 
agricultural scientists. The seed program will also call for AGRA to advocate for the 
seeds regulatory framework to make the seeds affordable to smallholder farmers.  
The Soil Health Program will focus on the dissemination of locally adapted 
and environmentally friendly soil fertility practices including the use of farm 
manure, grain legumes, water harvest, conservation agriculture and agro-forestry, 
and water management. It will also involve the use of some inorganic fertilizer but 
the focus is on other locally adaptable environmentally friendly soil management 
systems. The African Soil Information system, which is a joint initiative of AGRA, 
the CGIAR‟s International center for Tropical Agriculture, and Columbia University, 
use data collected on African soils to improve the way the soils are evaluated, 
monitored and managed.  
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For the Market Access Program, AGRA will engage in activities like creation 
of rural market places and commodity exchange which reduce transaction cost. 
AGRA will also support programs that will add value to farmers‟ crops like small 
milling or food processing operations. With regard to Policy and Partnerships 
Program, AGRA will engage national governments and donors to establish an 
enabling environment to pave the way for a Green Revolution in Africa. Some of the 
policies will include advocating or lobbying for seeds, fertilizers and market policies 
at national and regional levels, and building national policy hubs to develop policies 
paving the way for Green Revolution. 
Thus the new Green revolution in Africa recognizes the difference in 
challenges faced in African Agriculture (like diverse agro-ecological conditions and 
small-scale nature of the farms), and tries to fashion a program that will thrive in the 
African case, and at the same time trying to minimize the adverse effect the earlier 
revolution had on the environment in Asia and Latin America. Many researchers 
have had doubts as to whether this new green revolution for Africa will work. Their 
pessimism stem from the fact that since this new Green Revolution is being pushed 
by the same players like the Rockefeller Foundation, who initiated the earlier 
Revolution, this is more or else like an old wine in a new bottle. And since the earlier 
Green revolution did not work for Africa, this new Green Revolution is also likely to 
fail. It is also argued in some quarters that this New Green revolution is another form 
of neocolonialism (Dano, 2007). Whether this new revolution will work or not will 
depend on how committed the NARCs, IARs, financial institutions and donors are 
and whether African farmers will be actively involved in the development of the 
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appropriate crop varieties. The African farmer will only adopt the new technology if 
she believes that the new technology package will reduce the risk of crop of crop 
failure. So not only it is important to make the technology package available to the 
farmers, but the farmers should be involved in putting together the package and also 
making them affordable. For instance, farmers are supposed to work closely with 
researchers in breeding improved crop varieties and also offering inputs in breeding 
newer versions of already available improved varieties.  Also it is important that all 
the four programs of AGRA (seeds, soil health, market access, and policy and 
partnerships) are provided in a coordinated fashion. For instance, it would not do 
much good to the farmer if she is supplied with a high yielding variety when there is 
no available market to sell the surplus or no means of processing the surplus created 
by the adoption of the new yield. It will only result in high post harvest losses.  
Because tropical developing countries like Brazil has encountered and been 
able to overcome similar agricultural challenges faced by most African countries, it 
has been suggested that African countries can learn a lot from them, in developing its 
agricultural productivity. The prospect of south-south cooperation in agricultural 
productivity is examined below. 
4.5 South-South Cooperation as a possible boost to Africa’s Agricultural 
Productivity 
As mentioned above, there are new ideas of how Africa should proceed in 
order to increase its agricultural productivity. It has been argued that South-South 
cooperation has a better prospect of transforming Africa‟s agriculture than the 
current relationship between various International agricultural research institutions 
and national agricultural research centers.  
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South-South cooperation has to do with the fact that other developing 
countries that have been able to transform their agricultural productivity should take 
a central role in transforming Africa‟s agricultural. This proposition is based on the 
premise that since developing countries may have similar climatic conditions (e.g. 
tropical climate) and also some have been able to get around most obstacles to 
agricultural productivity (e.g. low nutrient soil, varying rainfall pattern) that has 
plagued African agriculture, they will be in the better position to help Africa improve 
its agricultural productivity. In this section, I study how Brazil was able to transform 
its agricultural productivity and how they can play a key role in transforming 
agricultural productivity of Africa.   
South-South cooperation can be an important means by which African 
countries can adapt some of the best agricultural technology and practices that have 
worked in countries with similar agroecological conditions. This cooperation can 
range from working together on common challenges in agricultural productivity, 
adaptation to climatic change, water conservation, to rural development and poverty 
reduction. Even though the earlier Green Revolution of one size fits all technological 
package may not have worked for Africa, there are a lot that Africa may learn from 
the earlier Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America, especially the roles played 
by agro-industries and marketing sectors. One benefit from South-South cooperation 
is that all of the programs that AGRA intends to rollout in Africa have been applied 
in one form or another in tropical developing countries. For instance, Brazil has been 
able to transform its agricultural sector through the development of high yielding 
crops using soil conservation practices like less to no tillage. The cooperation 
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between Africa and other developing countries have been ongoing and some 
successes have been chalked up as a result.  
For instance Bangladesh‟s innovation in micro credit has been applied with 
some degree of success in many African countries. The Hunger Project‟s 
Microfinance program established in 1999 has since grown its loan portfolio to 
approximately US$2.4 million across Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda.
44
  With respect to agricultural 
cooperation between African countries on one hand and other developing countries 
on the other, a clear success has been the introduction of robust high yielding rice 
called the New Rice for Africa (NERICA). The introduction of NERICA is a 
manifestation of a remarkable cooperation between Africa and Asia.  As already 
indicated, the NERICA is a hybrid that combines the robust nature of African rice 
and high yielding Asian rice traits. The NERICA is reported to yield up to 50% more 
grain than the traditional African varieties, and even quadruple its yield when 
fertilizer is used. The development of NERICA shows, among other things, two main 
things: First it exemplifies the importance of involving farmers in identifying the 
problem and then participating in developing the necessary technology. The 
successful development of the NERICA, is due in part to farmers providing valuable 
feedback to the scientist, after the farmers have grew several varieties. The scientists 
were able to learn the traits valued by the farmers and then incorporate them into the 
development of NERICA.  Second, it shows the potential success of South-South 
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 Viet Nam also has some cooperation with some African countries, 
including an agricultural cooperation with Mozambique.  
Despite these successes, there is no developing country like Brazil that has 
the means and commitment to transfer and share agricultural technology with 
African countries. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), 
which is linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, is in charge of the 
agricultural research cooperation between Brazil and African countries. EMBRAPA 
opened an African regional office in Accra, Ghana, in 2006 to oversee its activities 
in Africa. As of 2007, EMBRAPA had agreements with over 23 African countries, 
which represent about 60 percent of total international collaboration that EMBRAPA 
have with other countries (Galerani and Bragantini, 2007). Brazil‟s technical 
cooperation in Africa has focused on the transfer of skills, capacity building, 
empowerment of local workers, and projects adapted to the reality of the countries in 
question. What makes this collaboration promising is that EMBRAPA has the means 
to transform ones agricultural system, like it did in Brazil, and also the commitment 
to do it, by establishing a regional office in Africa. 
4.5.1 Case Study: The Agricultural Transformation of Brazil 
Before the1970s, Brazil‟s predominant agricultural commodities were coffee 
and sugarcane. The First World War and the Brazilian Revolution in 1930 led to 
intense cultivation of other crops other than coffee and sugarcane, though 
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 The FAO awarded the World Food Prize in 2004 to Dr Monty Jones (popularly called the father of 
NERICA) for the role he played in developing NERICA at AfricaRice (formerly called West Africa 
Rice Development Association, WARDA), which is a member of CGIAR. 
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agricultural holdings were mostly organized on small scale basis. Products like 
oranges, corn and other foodstuffs got support from the federal government, under 
the policy of import substitution (Lopes, 2010). It was only in the 1960s that 
attempts were first made to modernize agriculture with the establishment of the 
National Rural Credit Program in 1965, this organization was given the 
responsibility of providing finance to famers to buy modern inputs and equipment.  
Agricultural production before the 1970s was also concentrated in the 
temperate South/Southeast part of Brazil, and crop yields were low. This resulted in 
food supply crisis and high rural poverty levels. There was also no specific 
knowledge about tropical agriculture since agricultural production mostly took place 
in the southern temperate part of the country. Another problem with Brazil‟s 
agricultural sector before the 1970s was an institutional void (with respect to 
agricultural research, education, and governmental agencies) and lack of improved 
infrastructure (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, 2010).  
In the 1970s, the federal government created a Rural Insurance Program 
(PROAGRO), Embrapa, and the Enterprise for Technical Assistance and Rural 
Extension (Embrater). In addition many state governments created their own 
agricultural research organizations during this period. These actions undertaken by 
both the federal and the state governments, and their continual support for the 
agricultural sector since, have resulted in a major evolution of Brazilian agricultural 
production after the 1970s. As already indicated, agricultural production used to take 
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place mostly in a small southern part of the country. Now total land area cultivated 
has expanded throughout the Southeast portion of the country.  
Within three decades, Brazil was able to transform itself from a food importer 
to one of the world‟s great breadbaskets. It is also the first country, and only tropical 
country, to catch up with the traditional “big five” grain exporters (the USA, Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, and the European Union). Between 1996 and 2006, the value of 
Brazil‟s crops increased by about 365%, from 23 billion reais ($23 billion) to 108 
billion reais (The Economist, 08/26/2010). Its beef exports also increased tenfold in a 
decade. In 1994, Brazil‟s soybean production accounted for a third of the world 
exports, second only to the USA. In 2008, Brazil exported more than 1500 types of 
agricultural products to foreign markets. It is now the world largest exporter of 
poultry, sugar cane, orange juice, coffee, beef, and soybeans (SPA/MAPA-
Agricultura Brasileira em Numeros). Table 4.1 lists some of the products that Brazil 
is a major producer of and exporter. Figure 4.1 also shows that the real price index of 
staple food has been declining steadily from a 1974 high of 1 to about 0.024 in 2000. 
This indicates how agricultural production of staple food has increased steadily. 
What is even more astonishing about Brazil‟s agricultural production is how 
it has been able to achieve this success. Brazil was able to transform its agricultural 
sector, not through subsidies and protection of farmers, but through advanced 
technology and open trade. Even though Brazil has the largest spare farmland in the 
world, sustainability in agricultural production has been its focus. Since 1996, the 
area under cultivation in Brazil has increased by about a third, and this has not 
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happened in the Amazon rainforest but in the savanna lands of cerrado. The cerrado 
consists of 200 million hectares of tropical savanna which, prior to the 1970s, was 
thinly populated and only used for extensive cattle grazing. The transformation of the 
cerrado into a vibrant agricultural region is one of the major achievements of 
Embrapa. Today, the cerrado accounts for about 70 percent of Brazil‟s total farm 
output (The Economist, 08/26/2010). The Cerrado region was transformed by 
Embrapa by first reducing the levels of acidity in the soils through liming.
46
 Also 
Embrapa bred varieties of rhizobium, a bacterium that helps fix nitrogen in legumes 
and hence reduces the need for chemical fertilizer. Second, through cross breeding, 
Embrapa used a grass called brachiaria, from Africa, to create a variety called 
braquiarinha, which produces about 20-25 tonnes of grass feed per hectare, far more 
than what the local grass could have produced. The third and most important thing 
Embrapa did was to turn soybean into a tropical crop through cross breeding. 
Soybeans originated from north-east China, a temperate region. Brazil also has been 
importing a genetically modified soya seeds, and is now the world‟s second largest 
grower of genetically modified soya after the USA. Embrapa also created a new 
variety of soya, which is more resistant to acidic soils.  
Finally Embrapa pioneered and encouraged new operational farm techniques. 
These techniques include “no-tillage” agriculture, where the soil is not ploughed and 
crops are harvested not at the ground level, but rather cut high on the stalk. This puts 
less stress on the soil. Also monoculture was replaced with what is called forest, 
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carbonates, oxides, and hydroxides to the soil to reduce its acidity. In the Brazilian case, pulverized 
limestone was applied to the soil. 
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agriculture and livestock integration, where the fields are used alternatively for crops 
and livestock but threads of trees are also planted in between the fields for cattle 
foraging. Thus the cerrado region was transformed by Embrapa through various 
cutting-edge technology ranging from liming of the soil to lessen its acidity, nitrogen 
fixation, creation of acid resistant soybeans, to cross breeding. 
4.5.2 The Role Played by EMBRAPA in Transforming Brazil’s Agricultural 
Productivity 
 
The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), a 
semiautonomous federal agency was established in 1973 and administered by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply. Embrapa is the largest component of 
the National System for Agricultural Research and Innovation (SNPA), and the 
largest agricultural R&D agency in Latin America, based on both the number of 
employees and expenditure.
47
 For instance, in 2007, the agency had 8,695 
employees, with 2,020 scientists and 1,580 of them with doctoral degrees. The 
Embrapa working budget was US$1 billion for 2009. Embrapa has been able to build 
its research capacity in the past four decades. For instance, while the number of 
scientist with PhDs and Master of Science (MSc) degrees increased from 15 and 133 
in 1974 to 1580 and 596, respectively, in 2007, the number of employees with only 
Bachelor of Science (BSc) degrees, however, decreased from 724 to 31 over the 
same period (Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply Report, 2010). 
Embrapa operates forty-two research centers in Brazil, three virtual laboratories 
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 The SNPA is a two tier system of federal-and state based agencies responsible for organizing, 
coordinating and implementing research, with the objective of improving agricultural productivity and 
development, sustainable use and preservation of natural resources.  The components of SNPA are 
State Research Institutes, universities and Embrapa.  
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abroad (in the USA, South Korea, and the Netherlands), and three technology 
transfer centers in Ghana, Venezuela, and Panama. The purpose of the virtual 
laboratories (Labex) abroad is for cooperation in cutting-edge agricultural R&D. 
4.5.3 How Can Brazil Help Africa? 
There has always been the concern as to whether Brazil‟s agricultural 
technology can be transferred to Africa. This is a very legitimate concern because the 
pioneers of the earlier Green Revolution attempted to implement similar 
technologies that have worked well in Asia, but not in Africa. As already indicated, 
technology in general, and agricultural technology in particular can be ecologically 
specific and hence be difficult to transfer across different ecological zones. But 
Brazil has some similarities with most African countries with respect to climate, 
soils, Biomes, and farming systems.
48
  
Most of Brazil is in the tropics and Brazilian researchers are familiar with the 
challenges that come with tropical agriculture, like poor soil nutrients. Brazil has 
been able to overcome these challenges, which makes it a good candidate to succeed 
in Africa with respect to transferring and adapting agricultural technology. The soils 
of the cerrado region which now account for about 70 percent of the agricultural 
production in Brazil, is very similar to most of the grasslands in Africa. In fact, as 
Sanchez (2001) indicated, many of the soils of subhumid tropical Africa, especially 
in East Africa, is similar to that of cerrado, but while in the case of cerrado, lime 
was needed to reduce the soil acidity, in the case of East Africa, the soil is not 
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organisms. It is often referred to as ecosystems. 
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aluminum toxic and therefore liming is not necessary. The other difference is that the 
cerrado receives relatively more rainfall than most of the African grasslands. It is 
clear that the challenges with respect to cerrado soils will be similar, if not worse, to 
that of most of the grasslands in Africa, so one will anticipate that the technology 
that was used to transform this grassland into a breadbasket can be applied in Africa, 
with the necessary institutional framework. 
As discussed above, the Brachiaria, used to create a variety called 
braquiarinha, which produces about 20-25 tonnes of grass feed per hectare, far more 
than what the local grass can produce originated from Africa, and the nelore cattle 
herd came from India. It is quite possible that the technology that was used to 
transform this grass, Brachiaria, can easily be applied in Africa since the grass 
originated from there.  
Embrapa also has expertise and research centers for most of the tropical 
staple crops. One of the reasons cited as to why some of the agricultural technology 
from the temperate regions may not work in the tropical region is that they have 
different staple crops and hence the focus of their research is different. This is even 
more important with respect to agricultural biotechnology. As Cammandeur (1997) 
indicated, with the exception of corn, there was no temperate country research on 
most of the tropical African crops like banana, cassava, sweet potatoes, millet, and 
sorghum. There has however been some research on crops like sorghum and cassava, 
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undertaken by CGIAR under its network of international agricultural research.
49
 This 
indicates that the research focus of most of the temperate agriculture is on crops 
other than these tropical staple crops. Brazil however provides some hope in this 
regard. Brazil has research centers for cassava and sorghum and has made some huge 
strides in these tropical staples.  
Brazil already had diplomatic relations with many African countries, 
especially the Portuguese speaking African countries like Angola and Cape Verde, 
but a major step was taken in transferring agricultural technology in Africa when the 
Embrapa African regional office was opened in 2006 in Accra, Ghana.  
What one can see from the Brazilian experience was a multifaceted approach 
involving the training of manpower, the breeding of improved crop varieties, soil 
management and active participation of both the federal and states governors in the 
provision of the required institutions, safety nets (through insurance programs) and 
infrastructure. As an article published in The Economist (Accessed August 26
th
, 
2010) emphasized, Embrapa‟s methodology is a “system approach”, with all the 
interventions working together. This means that whether the technology transfer in 
Africa will work or not will be due in part to institutional framework that will be put 
in place by the various African governments. These institutional frameworks may 
include the development of the rural sector, with the provision of roads, and market. 
Also the National agricultural institutions of various African countries will have to 
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be strengthened to sustain and manage any technology that may be imported from 
other southern countries. 
4.6 Government Led Approach 
The general consensus has been that the earlier Green Revolution was 
technology driven, but there were important public interventions in the area of 
development of rural infrastructure (like building of feeder roads, electricity supply 
and irrigation), institutional intervention – subsidies for inputs, provision of credit 
facilities, and in some cases the practice of price support system. I argue that 
Africa‟s main obstacle in developing its agricultural productivity is not so much 
about the approach (i.e. either comprehensive approach or focused approach). What 
Africa needs are strong leaders who will see agriculture productivity as the key 
sector that will reduce poverty that has engulfed the continent and devote the 
necessary resources and commitment to its development. Whichever approach Africa 
decides to pursue to develop its agricultural sector, without its leaders taking the 
central role in providing the necessary infrastructure, and enabling institutional 
framework, that approach is bound to fail.  
The main trend of the Green Revolution in Asia (in particular in India, 
Philippines and Indonesia) were driven by technology (i.e. high yielding seeds, 
fertilizer, and irrigation). But the national leaders played a key role in making sure 
this package was affordable to the farmers, and created the environment to reduce 
the risk of adopting this new technology package by the farmers. As Djurfeldt et al. 
(2005), reports, the governments of these three countries, India, Philippines and 
118 
 
Indonesia, in their effort to make this new technology package affordable, subsidized 
the main agricultural inputs (i.e. fertilizer and the improved seeds) and also provided 
credit facilities to farmers through rural banks and cooperative associations, 
especially in India. There was also huge investment in human capital in the form of 
offering scholarship to the indigenes to obtain advanced degrees in agricultural 
agronomy and economics in developed countries like the USA. Also more 
importantly there was huge public investment in the provision of physical 
infrastructure in at least the rural regions better potential in agricultural productivity. 
African leaders will have to play a similar role in developing its agricultural 
productivity, albeit with some variations.   
With respect to public spending on agriculture, road construction is very 
important in the transportation of both inputs and outputs. As already indicated, sub-
Saharan Africa is the region with the lowest consumption of fertilizer in part because 
of the high cost of fertilizer caused by high transportation cost. Insufficient use of 
fertilizer has been given as one reason why the earlier Green Revolution did not 
reach Africa as expected. In a survey among traders in Benin, Madagascar, and 
Malawi, it was found that transport cost accounts for about 50 - 60 percent of the 
total marketing cost of agricultural products (Fafchamps et al., 2005). Therefore 
improving road networks in rural areas in Africa in particular, will reduce both the 
cost of agricultural inputs and outputs, and hence their prices. As in cases like Punjab 
in India, African leaders can concentrate in providing at least feeder roads in areas 
having high agricultural productivity potential. Another important public expenditure 
on agriculture in Africa should be irrigation. Most African smallholder farmers 
119 
 
depend on rainfall as the main source of water for their crops. The problem with 
rainfall is that the amount is erratic and is not a reliable source of water. Rainfall 
variability in Africa is about twice that of the temperate regions (World Bank, 2004). 
Droughts in the region are also more frequent than any other region in the world 
(World Bank, 2007). Lack of access to water reduces the incentive to use fertilizer 
since the use of fertilizer without sufficient water results in crop loss. Governments 
providing irrigation will go a long way in reducing water variability, reducing the 
risk of crop loss, and hence increase the adoption of new modern varieties. 
Another essential public investment in the agricultural sector is the 
development of human capital and R&D expenditure. Training of agricultural 
scientists and extension officers is very important in the development of improved 
modern varieties of crops and the dissemination of those crops to farmers. The 
development of human capital in the area of agriculture is even more important than 
it was during the earlier Green Revolution where some work had already been done 
for the main crops like Rice. Also because of the similar farming system (e.g. 
irrigation farming system), these bred improved varieties were easily exported to 
other countries. For instance, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) 
developed the semi dwarf variety, borrowing from rice breeding work done in China, 
Japan, and Taiwan. India jumpstarted its Green Revolution by importing improved 
varieties from the IRRI. In the case of Africa, most of the main food stuff like 
cassava, maize, have not benefited much already existing breeding work on them. 
And even if these improved varieties for the main African food crops exist, it would 
not be easily adapted in different African countries because of the diverse agro-
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ecological zones and different farming systems.  This makes it more necessary for 
African leaders to develop their national agricultural research centers in order for 
them to undertake meaningful research. Local researchers will be better informed on 
the constraints that local crops face, which will form the basis for the development of 
new modern varieties. If African countries are to take a leading role in their 
agricultural development agenda, then they should take a key role in both the 
breeding and dissemination of improved modern crop varieties. Embrapa in Brazil 
played a key role in transforming agricultural productivity there. Also Indonesia, 
academic scholars in economics and agricultural science mostly trained in developed 
countries (popularly called the „Berkeley Mafias‟) and politicians worked hand in 
hand in developing the country‟s agricultural productivity (Djurfeldt et al., 2005). 
African leaders should also create the enabling investment climate for private 
sector to invest in the agricultural sector through developments of finance and 
dissemination of agricultural inputs. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions where 
farmers have a high unmet demand for credit (World Bank, 2005). Before structural 
adjustment program, some of these credits were met by the government through 
provision of subsidies, and distribution of inputs, like seeds and fertilizer, on credit. 
This resulted in huge government budget deficit because of large number of 
defaulters. The advent of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s curtailed those 
facilities, and hence worsening the credit plight of the farmers. Unlike in 
Bangladesh, where the private sector was ready to perform the various functions, like 
the provision of credit to the farmers, which were undertaking by the government, 
the private banks in most of the African countries are unwilling to offer credit to 
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farmers because of the high risk of default. African leaders can help by creating the 
enabling environment for the establishment of microfinance institutions like rural 
banks, where they can lend to cooperative farmers. Lending to cooperative farmers 
associations spread the liability and hence members encouraging each other to repay 
the loans. This will reduce the number of defaulters. 
Finally one important problem confronting African farmers that have not 
been discussed much in the literature is the post harvest losses. This normally occurs 
because of lack of available closer markets for perishable crops like tomatoes, which 
go bad often few days after they are harvested. So during bumper harvest, in order to 
reduce this post harvest losses, farmers are forced to sell their products at lower 
prices. In earlier Green revolution, countries like India instated price support system 
to reduce this variability in the prices of farm products (Djurfeldt et al., 2005). 
African leaders can also help by the provision storage facilities in the main 
agricultural producing towns. 
Toenniessen et al., 2008, discuss the important role policy makers and donors 
played in the earlier Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America with respect to the 
provision of physical infrastructure and provision of financial support. In particular, 
they indicated that, the governments in Asia and donor agencies manipulated 
markets (for both inputs and outputs) to promote the adoption of high yielding 
technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. These interventions undertaken by various 
governments in Asia went a long way in reducing the risk of adopting the new 
technology (like new high yielding crops and fertilizer), and hence increasing the 
rate of the technology adoption. 
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I believe that any of the strategies discussed above, focus approach, or 
comprehensive approach, has the potential to be successful, but that African leaders 
need to take a central role in any strategy. It is very clear the important role the 
federal and states governments of Brazil played, in providing insurance policies and 
infrastructure, to spur the transformation of their agricultural productivity.  
It looks like the African leaders may be have finally realized the important 
role they play individually and collectively to improve Africa‟s agricultural 
productivity as seen by the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) 
initiative. What remains to be seen is whether all the boardroom talk will translate 
into action.  
The Brazilian experience shows how important role state and public 
institutions played transforming its agricultural sector. The state was instrumental in 
training its human capita (specifically agricultural scientist), provision of rural 
infrastructure, provision of safety nets, in the area of micro finance and subsidies, to 
reduce the risk of adopting a new technology. African leaders will also have to 
provide similar services even in a South-South cooperation. 
It is also important to point out that whether African leaders will have the 
incentive to put in place the necessary measures and policies that will ensure increase 
in agricultural productivity will in some part depend on the political economy of 
agricultural investment. As already indicated, McMillan and Masters (2000), argue 
that because of the average long gestation period of crops grown in the tropics, 
compared to that of the temperate region, tropical farmers incur higher sunk cost. 
McMillan and Masters argue further that once this large sunk cost is incurred, 
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leaders in the tropical impose high tax on farm income and products. Tropical 
farmers also knowing this will withhold investment in the first place. According to 
McMillan and Masters, the only way out of this low investment from tropical 
farmers for fear of higher taxes is for tropical leaders to be credible to the farmers 
that they will put in place measures for the farmers to maximize the return on their 
investment. 
In a recent study by Bates and Block (2011), they argue and show that 
political competition actually gives African leaders incentive to put in place policies 
that will increase agricultural productivity. They suggest that in an era of lack of 
political competition, policies will be “urban biased”, because the urban population 
constitute more organized interest group than their counterpart in the rural areas. The 
rural farmers are dispersed geographically and hence organizing cost is high. 
However, with electoral competition, politicians will have the incentive to bear the 
cost of political organization. With farmers constituting a greater proportion of the 
population in most African countries, political leaders will have no choice than to put 
in place policies that will not be detrimental to farmers, if they have any intention of 
retaining their political power. Bates and Block (2011) were able to show that 
electoral competition has actually resulted in policies that are favorable to farmers, 
which in turn resulted in modest increase in agricultural productivity in Africa. The 
good news is that political competition has been increasing steadily in Africa since 
early 1990‟s and hopefully African leaders will continue to have the incentive to put 





In this chapter, I set out to examine why the Green Revolution did not reach 
Africa in the same way it did for Asia and Latin America. I also looked at the various 
strategies that have been proposed to help Africa transform its agricultural 
productivity. I then conclude by proposing that the success of any strategy hinges on 
the central role Africa leaders will have to take, and the commitment they will have 
to exhibit in transforming their agricultural productivity. 
The strategies propose are the focused approach and comprehensive 
approach. It is believed that since tropical developing countries may have 
encountered similar problems in their effort to transform their agricultural sector, 
African countries can learn a lot from them in improving their agricultural 
productivity. While the comprehensive approach believe that any agricultural 
strategy should involve the simultaneous pursuance of all aspects of agricultural 
productivity (crop breeding, soil management, provision of infrastructure, and 
enabling policies), the proponents of focus approach believe that inadequate 
resources may not allow for comprehensive form of strategy. Therefore, proponents 
of focus group propose that African countries should just concentrate on a crop, for 
instance rice, where a body of knowledge is already available, and when yield 
improves, public investment infrastructure will subsequently follow. 
While I agree some aspects of all the strategies proposed, I argue that the 
success of any or a combination of them will depend on the important role played by 
African leaders. African leaders are supposed to maintain some level of 
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macroeconomic and political stability before any agricultural approach will have any 
chance of succeeding. Also any approach (i.e. focused or comprehensive) will need 
availability of physical infrastructure like roads and irrigation systems. Also Africa is 
supposed to sustain any growth in agricultural productivity, there should be home 
grown scientists who will always be available to bread improved crop varieties for 
farmers. African leaders will also be needed to create the necessary environment 
enable private investors to invest in the agricultural sector. I believe that a good 
strategy may encompass a dose of comprehensive approach, focused approach, in a 













Table 4.1: Brazil’s World Food Ranking 
Product Production Exports 
Sugar 1st 1st 
Orange Juice 1st 1st 
Coffee 1st 1st 
Beef 2nd 1st 
Soybean 2nd 1st 
Tobacco 3rd 1st 
Broiler 3rd 2nd 
Corn 3rd 4th 
Source: SPA/MAPA (Agricultura Brasileira em Numeros) 
 











Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
This study sets out to examine why African countries attract less FDI, and 
also why they have not been able experience the agricultural transformation 
experienced by its Asian and Latin America counterparts. Finally the study 
highlights the pivotal role African leaders will have to play in any solution to 
Africa‟s abysmal agricultural productivity.  
I find that that infrastructural quality, good investment climate and 
government stability are positively correlated with FDI. Also I find that while natural 
resources (measured here by fuel exports) are positively associated with FDI flow to 
SSA, it is negatively associated with FDI flow to non-SSA region. Finally, below 
certain level, GDP per capita and corruption are positively associated with FDI flow 
to SSA. 
In chapter 3, we find broad and consistent support for the idea that fertilizer 
usage, telephones, and rainfall have a positive effect on agricultural productivity.  
This is true both inside and outside of Africa.  We find evidence that the effect of 
irrigation, however, is different in tropical SSA.  In our baseline sample, the 
coefficient on irrigation was only significant outside of Africa.  In our alternative 
sample, the coefficient was positive in both but the quantitative impact of irrigation 
was much reduced in SSA. Using an alternative definition of tropicality, which 
increases the number of countries in our sample, we do find that government stability 
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is positively related to agricultural productivity, and that corruption is particularly 
harmful to productivity in SSA. 
Chapter 4 shows that African leaders have a lot to learn from their 
counterparts in Asia and Latin America, if they want to boost their agricultural 
productivity. In particular they will have to play similar roles played by Asian 
leaders, during the earlier Green Revolution. They will have to improve rural 
infrastructure, make complementary inputs like fertilizer affordable, and provide 
some safety nets to reduce the risk of adoption of new technology. The good thing is 
that the political climate currently existing in most African countries, give the 
African leaders added incentive to put in place the necessary policies that will 
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